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I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws . . . are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protec-
tion of our fundamental personal freedoms.'
Our free enterprise system is based on a principle of competition, a
principle recognized in both federal and state antitrust laws. Enforcing
these laws promotes the existence of a competitive business climate; a
climate which not only rewards industry, but also affords consumers a
greater variety of choices, better quality products and services, and lower
prices.
One of the most significant recent developments in antitrust enforce-
ment in the United States is the resurgence of state antitrust enforcement
as a productive counterpart to federal antitrust efforts. Prior to enactment
of the Sherman Act of 1890,2 at least thirteen states had some type of an-
titrust statute. The Sherman Act was intended to "supplement the en-
forcement of the established rules of the common and statute law by the
courts of the several States. . . ." After its enactment, however, states vir-
tually abandoned their individual antitrust enforcement efforts-a 1956
survey revealed that only five states had filed antitrust suits in the
preceeding twenty years. 5 A variety of reasons has been offered to explain
this change, e.g., inadequate investigative capabilities, a lack of full-time
prosecutorial personnel, weak sanctions, fear of driving away industry,
and powerful opposition by business interests.6
In the last decade, however, the United States has witnessed a strong
revival in state antitrust enforcement. 7 This renewed inteiest can be at-
1. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J.).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. The states were Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and Texas. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF
AN AMERICAN TRADITION 155 n.195 (1955). Before 1890, however, these states
made little effort to enforce their antitrust statutes. See generally Jones, Historical
Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE LJ. 905 (1926).
Six of these states also had constitutional prohibitions against trusts and
monopolies: Kentucky, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and Texas. H. THORELLI, supra, at 155 n.196. Eight other states had
similar constitutional prohibitions: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Maryland, Montana, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. n. 194.
4. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
5. Wood, Resurgence of State Antitrust Action: Prices and Public
Awareness, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 4, at 41 (1977).
6. Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
653, 697-98 (1974). See generally H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 156.
7. See Miles, Current Trends in State Antitrust Enforcement, 47 AN.
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tributed to a number of factors, two of which are worthy of special men-
tion. First, the state is a major purchaser of goods in the private
marketplace. Total state government expenditures in fiscal year 1978 were
$180 billion, eight percent of the gross national product." Because the state
is a major consumer, anticompetitive behavior, which artificially raises
market prices, significantly increases the cost of state government. This
gives the state a direct interest in and motivation for antitrust enforce-
ment. Second, state attorneys general are realizing that federal enforce-
ment authorities are less likely to intervene where the impact of an illegal
restraint of trade is focused within a single state. 9 Federal enforcement
agencies simply do not have the resources to attack all localized
restraints.10 Rather than attempting to increase federal resources, state in-
volvement seems to be a more reasonable, if not imperative, solution.
Irrespective of the reasons for this revival of state activity, the need for
effective state antitrust enforcement in conjunction with federal enforce-
ment is no longer a matter of debate.11 Only with active state participation
will we create the competitive climate necessary for our free enterprise
system.12
This Article will focus on four major areas relevant to the state's role in
antitrust enforcement. The first part will be a discussion of recent Missouri
and federal legislation that has provided the state Attorney General with
TITRUST L.J. 1343, 1344 (1979). See generally Project, Reviving State Antitrust
Enforcement: The Problems with Putting New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J.
CORP. L. 547 (1979); Rubin, supra note 6; Wood, supra note 5.
8. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 288 (1980).
9. See Fellmeth, Antitrust Enforcement by Local Prosecutors: Im-
pediments and Prospects, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1978). See generally Flynn,
Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting Future Directions for State An-
titrust Enforcement, 4J. CORP. L. 479 (1979).
10. See Flynn, supra note 9, at 481.
[I]t has become apparent that federal enforcement resources are limited
and must be devoted to cases of major economic or geographic
significance. The urge to displace competition by private agreement
takes place regularly in local markets under local circumstances beyond
the resources, interest, and, on occasion, jurisdiction of federal enforce-
ment agencies.
Id. See generally Fellmeth, supra note 9.
11. Rahl, State Antitrust Symposium: Introduction and Perspective, 4 J.
CORP. L. 475,476. See generally Flynn, supra note 9; Miles, supra note 7; Rubin,
supra note 6; Wood, supra note 5. A 1978 survey revealed that during 1977 states
with active antitrust enforcement agencies found 700 matters warranting
thorough investigation. Project, supra note 7, at 570.
12. "Antitrust is far too important to be left to the federal government
alone; the states very definitely have a role to play, a role which can be crucial to
the growth and protection of the business and economic climate of the state."
Almstedt & Tyler, State Antitrust Laws: New Directions in Missouri, 39 MO. L.
REV. 489, 520 (1974). See generally Flynn, supra note 9; Miles, supra note 7
1981]
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increased powers. Against this statutory backdrop, the remainder of the
Article will be devoted to three areas where state antitrust enforcement
units are focusing their attention and resources: first, state involvement as
plaintiff in treble damages litigation and other actions under federal anti-
trust laws; second, criminal and civil enforcement actions under state an-
titrust laws, includingparenspatriae actions pursuant to section 4c of the
Clayton Act;' 3 and third, out-of-court activities designed to educate the
public and to promote a strong policy of competition in the governmental
community.
The State of Missouri Antitrust Division's activity in these areas since
1976 will be used for analogy and example. 14 This survey of Missouri anti-
trust enforcement is intended to illustrate the benefits to be derived from a
strong policy of competition at the state level, as well as to identify the
areas within which an active state antitrust enforcement unit can operate.
II. RECENT ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
A. Missouri Enactments
Several states began to revise and update their antitrust laws during
the 1970s; the State of Missouri was no exception.', In 1974 the Missouri
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
14. Established in 1974 as a separate division, the Antitrust Division of the
Missouri Attorney General's Office has been an active part of that office since the
author became Attorney General in 1976. The antitrust staff now consists of four
full-time attorneys and one full-time paralegal. Future plans call for the merger
of the Consumer Protection Division and the Antitrust Division to form the Trade
Offense Division.
15. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.562-.596 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-1401 to -1413 (Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
16700-16760 (West 1964 & Cum. Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-24
to -45 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 480-1 to -37 (1976 &
Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 553.1-.17 (West Cum. Supp.
1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-101 to -120 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 1101-1107 (1980); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-201 to -213 (1975
& Cum. Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.701-.767 (1967 & Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.49-.66 (West Cum. Supp. 1981);
RSMO §§ 416.011-161 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 51-501 to -506, -519
to -524 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-801 to -830 (1978); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 356:1-:14 (1966 & Supp. 1977); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1
to -19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1331.01-.99
(Page 1979 & Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.705-.836 (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-1-3.1 to -22 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-911
to -926 (1979); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-9.1 to .17 (Cum. Supp. 1980); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-18-1 to -23 (1980);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.01-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
For a discussion of these statutes, see Project, supra note 7, at 616-20.
[Vol. 46
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General Assembly undertook the first complete overhaul of the state's an-
titrust laws in sixty-seven years; 16 the result was enactment of the Missouri
Antitrust Law of 1974.17
The need for revision was created by several apparent inadequacies in
Missouri's prior law. Prior to 1974, only articles of commerce were subject
to the law, leaving the broad range of restraints of trade occurring in con-
nection with services beyond the control of the state."' In addition, the
earlier law did not prohibit unilateral monopolization or unilateral at-
tempts to monopolize; it proscribed only those restraints of trade resulting
from a contract, agreement, or combination. 19
The enforcement and penalty provisions of the prior law were also in-
adequate. The state was limited to injunctive relief or the imposition of
fines and imprisonment. 20 Because of the statutory limit, monetary fines
proved to be of little deterrent value since the penalty seldom was equal to
the financial gain of the antitrust violation. 21 Imprisonment was imposed
rarely. 22
16. Missouri's pre-1974 antitrust laws, RSMO §§ 416.010-.400 (1969), de-
rived from thorough revisions enacted in 1907. 1907 Mo. Laws 377-84, §§
8967-8977. For a discussion of the historical development of these laws, see
Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 489-91.
17. RSMo §§ 416.011-.161 (1978). For an in-depth review of these provi-
sions, see Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12.
18. RSMO §§ 416.010-.040, .120 (1969). See, e.g., State v. Green, 344 Mo.
985, 988, 130 S.W.2d 475, 476-77 (1939) ("Laundries do not sell any articles
which come within the terms of the statute. True, the operation of a laundry is a
business. However, it sells a service and nothing more.").
19. RSMO §§ 416.010-.040 (1969). See, e.g., State ex rel. Hadley v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (En Banc 1909) (a single business which
attempted to monopolize an area of trade in intrastate commerce was not subject
to prosecution), affd, 224 U.S. 270 (1912). But see RSMO § 416.120 (1969)
(unilateral unfair discrimination).
The conspiracy element of an antitrust action is often the most difficult ele-
ment to prove. Without the "smoking gun" document specifically establishing a
conspiracy, it is difficult to show that the defendants were acting collusively in-
stead of independently. Where unilateral anticompetitive activity is prohibited,
the burden of proof for the state is easier to maintain. In fact, the state has the
added advantage of needing to prove only unilateral activity for a conviction even
when conspiring multiple defendants are involved.
20. See RSMO §§ 416.050, .130, .150, .260 (1969).
21. The maximum fine for most violations under prior law was $5,000.
See id. §§ 426.050, .130. The exception was a conviction for unfair discrimina-
tion, which carried a maximum fine of $10,000. Id. § 415.150. The revenues
which a defendant could obtain from antitrust violations usually outweighed the
maximum fines. See Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 506. See also notes
209-21 and accompanying text infra.
22. Imprisonment under the old Missouri provisions could not exceed one
year. See RSMO §§ 416.050, .130, .150 (1969). Little use was made of the im-
1981]
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Furthermore, the state was denied adequate investigative procedures
for enforcement of the prior law. The Attorney General was required to
seek a special hearing before a state supreme court judge to compel the
testimony of witnesses and production of documents. 23 This procedure
proved to be a serious impediment to the efficient and expeditious investi-
gation required for successful antitrust enforcement. 24
The 1974 revision of the state's antitrust laws addressed these and other
inadequacies, repealing the old law and replacing it with Missouri Revised
Statutes sections 416.011-.161.25 The Missouri Antitrust Law is, in
essence, a "little Sherman Act" and a "little section 3 Clayton Act." As in
section I of the Sherman Act, the new law prohibits contracts, combina-
tions, or conspiracies which restrain trade or commerce.2 6 The 1974
Missouri law parallels section 2 of the Sherman Act by forbidding
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or conspiracies to monopolize.2"
The new Missouri counterpart to section 3 of the Clayton Act28 forbids ex-
clusive dealings and tying arrangements which may "substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of trade or com-
merce." 29
prisonment sanctions, apparently because of the public's perception that anti-
trust violations were not crimes of violence or of moral turpitude. See Almstedt &
Tyler, supra note 12, at 491. See also note 216 and accompanying text infra.
23. RSMO § 416.310 (1969).
24. Successful investigation is often the key to successful enforcement of the
antitrust laws. The investigative procedures of the prior law were burdensome
and time-consuming. The expanded investigative procedures of the 1974 revision
are among the most innovative aspects of the new law. See notes 36-56 and ac-
companying text infra.
25. (1978). See generally Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12.
26. Compare RSMO § 416.031.1 (1978) with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). "Trade
or commerce" means any economic activity involving or relating to any commodi-
ty or service. RSMO § 416.021(4) (1978).
27. Compare RSMO § 416.031.2 (1978) with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The new
Missouri statute prohibits unilateral monopolization or unilateral attempts to
monopolize. Thus, the conspiracy element need not be proven for these viola-
tions. See note 19 supra.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
29. RSMO § 416.031.3 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has ap-
plied a lower threshold standard under § 3 of the Clayton Act than that used
under § I and § 2 of the Sherman Act. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
This lower standard should be the same as that applied under RSMO § 416.031.3
(1978).
Most Clayton Act violations would be a violation of the Sherman Act, but the
Clayton Act covers a broader area than the Sherman Act. It is intended to arrest,
in its incipiency, conduct which might develop into a Sherman Act violation. See
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ANTITRUST 432 (1977). The same con-
clusions logically apply to the new Missouri provisions.
[Vol. 46
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The new Missouri law gives the Attorney General greater enforcement
powers at the state level. These powers were effected by first, creating stif-
fer penalties and providing procedures for more efficient criminal prose-
cutions; 0 second, granting the Attorney General broad, civil investigative
demand (CID) powers;3 1 and third, establishing an antitrust revolving
fund.
32
The new law makes it a misdemeanor to violate any provision of sub-
sections I or 2 of section 416.031, i.e., the "little Sherman Act."3 3 Reflect-
ing the penalty provisions of the Sherman Act, section 416.051 increased
the maximum criminal fine from the prior law's $5,000 to $50,000, 4
allowing imposition of fines more likely to be commensurate with the
crime and, thus, of greater deterrent value. The new law also provides for
imprisonment for a term not to exceed one year.35 All of these sanctions
take on added importance when considered with provisions of the new law
specifically authorizing the Attorney General to investigate all suspected
state criminal antitrust violations, commence and prosecute all violations,
and participate in any grand jury investigation of suspected criminal viola-
tions of the state antitrust laws.3 6 These provisions make it more likely that
prosecution for violations will ensue and that these sanctions will be im-
posed. The 1974 law also provides for the issuance of a civil contempt cita-
tion against any person found in contempt of a court order enforcing the
30. RSMo § § 416.051 (1978).
31. Id. § 416.091.
32. Id. § 416.081.
33. Id. § 416.051.1. Criminal penalties are prescribed only for violations of
these subsections because the law is fairly definite and the illegal activity relatively
easy to detect. At the federal level, the Justice Department also has a policy of
criminally prosecuting only violations which amount to per se violations. See
generally Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 506; Project, supra note 7, at 639.
34. RSMO § 416.051.1 (1978). Missouri's maximum criminal fine of $50,000
applies to both individuals and corporations.
The Sherman Act was amended in 1974 to increase the maximum criminal
fine to $100,000 for individuals and $1 million for corporations. Act of Dec. 21,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970)).
35. RSMo § 416.051.1 (1978). The maximum imprisonment allowable is
the same as under the prior law. See note 22 supra. The maximum term for im-
prisonment under the Sherman Act is three years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
36. RSMO § 416.051.2 (1978). This section authorizes the Attorney General
to participate in any grand jury investigation of a suspected violation of the
Missouri Antitrust Law, even though the use of the grand jury is not referred to
specifically by the language of the statute. It was the intent of the legislature in
the third sentence of the statute to empower the Attorney General with the same
authority as a county prosecuting attorney. See II HOUSEJ., 77th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. 1363 (1974). See also Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 507 n.116.
Under Missouri law, a county prosecuting attorney has the right to appear and
participate in grand jury proceedings. RSMO §§ 540.130-.140 (1978).
1981]
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substantive provisions of that law; the civil contempt fine can be as much
as $20,000. s3 Not to be ignored are the other significant civil remedies
available under the new statute, which include treble damages actions by
the state and other persons,38 injunctive relief, 9 and divestiture. 40
Precomplaint civil investigative powers quite often are the key to suc-
cessful state antitrust enforcement. 41 Under the 1974 law, the Attorney
General receives broad investigative authority through the use of the civil
investigative demand (CID). 42 The enactment is modeled after the CID
provisions of the Antitrust Civil Process Act of 196243 whereby the United
States Attorney General, whenever he has reason to believe that any person
under investigation may be in possession, custody, or control of any
documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, may, prior
to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding, issue in writing and
cause to be served on that person a CID requiring such person to produce
the material for examination. 44 Federal CIDs have been upheld almost
37. Id. § 416.051.3.
38. Id. § 416.121.1(1).
39. Id. §§ 416.061.2, .071.1, .121.1(2).
40. Id. § 416.071.2.
41. This point was recognized in the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 343-44 (1955), quoted
in Rubin & Malet, State Initiatives in Antitrust Investigation, 4J. CORP. L. 513,
530 n.93 (1979):
The inevitable generality of most statutory antitrust prohibitions
renders facts of paramount importance. Accordingly, effective enforce-
ment requires full and comprehensive investigation before formal pro-
ceedings, civil or criminal, are commenced. Incomplete investigation
may mean proceedings not justified by more careful search and study.
Public retreat by the prosecutor may then be difficult, if not impossible,
and the result may be a public trial exhausting the resources of the
litigants and increasing court congestion. Thus the adequacy of in-
vestigatory processes can make or break any enforcement program.
42. RSMO § 416.091.1 (1978) provides:
Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that a person under
investigation may be in possession, custody, or control of any books,
documents, records, writings or tangible things, hereinafter referred to
as "documentary material," relevant to a civil investigation of a violation
of section 416.031, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal
proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such
person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce
such documentary material for examination.
At least 28 other states have enacted a similar form of antitrust precomplaint dis-
covery mechanism. See Project, supra note 7, at 670-75.
43. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (West Supp. Pamphlet 1981).
44. Id. § 1312. Initially, this CID power was narrowly confined to the
documents of corporations that were suspected of antitrust violations. See
Rashid, New Trends in Antitrust Investigations, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 188, 192
[Vol. 46
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without exception since 1949 when the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Morton Salt Co. 45 equated the investigative power of an
administrative agency with that of a grand jury, i.e., the Justice Depart-
ment can investigate merely on suspicion that the antitrust laws have
been violated. 4" The only significant difference between the federal and
Missouri CIDs is the absence of a provision in the Missouri Antitrust Law
comparable to that added to the federal law by Title I of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 7 allowing the CID to be
made on "any person. " 4 8 The Missouri law limits the use of the CID to
"targets" of the investigation.4 9
(1968). In 1976 amendments were added by Title I of the Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvements Act of 1976 to expand the CID provisions to cover any infor-
mation relevant to a civil antitrust investigation in the possession of any person.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §§
101-106, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1970)).
45. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
46. In Morton Salt, Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, stated:
The only power that is involved here is the power to get information
from those who can best give it and who are most interested in not doing
so. Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence
until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow
that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are en-
forced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry .... [The
power of an administrative agency is] analogous to the Grand Jury,
which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence
but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
Id. at 642-43.
The constitutionality of the CID provisions of the Antitrust Civil Process Act
has been challenged unsuccessfully on fourth amendment grounds. See Hyster
Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964); Petition of Gold Bond Stamp
Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), affdper curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir.
1964). Challenges based on statutory construction also have been unsuccessful.
Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. at 397 (court rejected any con-
struction of the Antitrust Civil Process Act which would not fulfill the broad pur-
poses to allow Attorney General to ascertain whether the antitrust laws have been
violated and to enable him to fashion a proper complaint).
Challenges at the state level to CID provisions also have been rejected. See,
e.g., In re Yankee Milk, Inc., 362 N.E.2d 207 (Mass. 1977) (rejected a challenge
based on the burden of compliance); People v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 19
A.D.2d 867, 244 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1963) (rejected a challenge based on a require-
ment that the state must prove the likelihood that the antitrust violation exists).
See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Killian, 30 Conn. Supp. 87, 301 A.2d 562 (Super. Ct.
1973); In re Southern Bell Tele. & Tele., 30 N.C. App. 585, 227 S.W.2d 645
(1973).
47. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (West Supp. Pamphlet 1981).
48. Id. See note 44 supra.
49. RSMO § 416.091.1 (1978). See note 42 supra.
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The 1974 Missouri law includes several requirements for use of the CID
that specify what the demand must contain and what it cannot contain, 0
the manner in which the CID is to be served, 51 and where the materials are
to be produced. 2 In addition, certain safeguards are imposed to prevent
abuse of the CID power. The statute provides that a member of the Attor-
ney General's staff must take possession of the materials, act as custodian
of the documents, and not show such materials to any person who is not a
member of the Attorney General's staff without consent from the person
who produced the materials.5 " There also are provisions for affording the
person on whom a demand is served a procedure for opposing the produc-
tion of documents.54 Finally, the new law allows the Attorney General to
petition the trial court for an order of enforcement to compel compliance
with the CID; any disobedience of such an order is punishable as con-
tempt.55
The CID provision of the Missouri Antitrust Law is an extremely im-
portant and powerful tool in the enforcement of a strong policy of com-
petition in the State of Missouri. Generally, it is the state's practice initially
to request voluntary disclosure from witnesses and prospective defendants
and to issue CIDs only in the event that more information is needed. The
record regarding the use of CIDs by the state demonstrates that the power
has been exercised in good faith. 6 Demands generally are limited in scope
and clearly pertinent to suspected illegal behavior. When possible, in cases
involving a substantial number of documents, the state has been willing to
review the documents while they remain in the hands of the original custo-
dian to avoid serious business interruption.
Inadequate funding historically has been a major reason for the lack of
effective antitrust enforcement at the state level.5 7 The Missouri Antitrust
Law offers a partial response to this problem with the creation of an "anti-
trust revolving fund." 8 The antitrust revolving fund is based on legislative
authorization to finance antitrust enforcement with the monies recovered
by the state in previous antitrust litigation. The new Missouri statute pro-
vides that all costs and expenses incurred by or under the office of the At-
50. RSMo § 416.091.2-.3 (1978).
51. Id. § 416.091.4-.5.
52. Id. § 416.091.7.
53. Id. § 415.091.6, .8.
54. Id. § 416.091.14-.16.
55. Id. § 416.091.13, .16.
56. There have been no successful challenges to Missouri's CID power since
enactment of the Missouri Antitrust Law of 1974. For a discussion of state usage
of CID provisions, see Miles, supra note 7, at 1347.
57. See Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEX. L.
REv. 753, 764 (1961). See also Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 512; Miles,
supra note 7, at 1352.
58. RSMo § 416.081 (1978).
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torney General in investigation, prosecution, or enforcement of the state
and federal antitrust laws may be paid from the fund. 9 Fourteen states
have antitrust revolving funds; 60 total state appropriations for these funds
in fiscal year 1979 exceeded $1 million.6 1 Antitrust revolving funds
generally are meant to be self-sufficient. It is important, however, that an-
nual legislative appropriations from a general fund be made to assist in
criminal and injunctive enforcement which does not bring the state signifi-
cant monetary recoveries and to help fund the enforcement unit in years of
small recoveries.6 2
B. Federal Enactments
Recent federal legislation perhaps has done more to revive interest in
state antitrust enforcement than any other single factor. In 1974 Congress
passed legislation which amended the Sherman Act by increasing the
59. Id. § 416.081.2 provides: "Such money, after appropriation pursuant to
law, shall be available for the payment of all costs and expenses incurred by the
attorney general in investigation, prosecution or enforcement of the provisions of
... [this Act] or federal laws relating to antitrust, trade regulation, restraint of
trade or price fixing activities."
Under the Missouri scheme, the Antitrust Revolving Fund consists, in part, of
money transferred by the General Assembly from the general revenue fund. In
addition, 10% of all recoveries obtained by the Attorney General through state
antitrust litigation, whether by settlement or by judgment, shall be paid into the
Fund. Furthermore, all moneys recovered as court costs are credited to the An-
titrust Revolving Fund. Id. § 416.081.1, .5. The moneys are paid out of the Fund
by the State Treasurer on warrants issued by the State Auditor, as certified by the
State Comptroller, after verified vouchers are submitted by the Attorney
General. See generally Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 511-12.
60. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531.01 (West Gum. Supp. 1980-1981);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12526 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-32a (West
Cum. Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1653 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-715 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 95, § 14 (West Gum. Supp.
1981); RSMO § 416.081 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.260 (1976); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:9-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.82
(Page 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 180.095-.097 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-922 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.10.210-.220 (West Gum. Supp.
1981); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-19 (1980).
61. Only four of these states appropriated funds for fiscal year 1979:
Arizona ($55,594); Florida ($829,172); Missouri ($52,856); Oregon ($156,680).
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST REVOLVING
FUNDS (1979).
62. Some state antitrust revolving funds are meant to establish self-sufficient
antitrust divisions of attorneys general offices. The "ten percent" figure in
Missouri, however, is at best a partial solution to the funding problem. Addi-
tional annual appropriations by the General Assembly are necessary to ensure the
viability of Missouri's antitrust enforcement efforts. See generally Miles, supra
note 7, at 1353-54; Project, supra note 7, at 590. 11
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criminal penalty for violation of the Act from a misdemeanor to a felony,
increasing maximum criminal fines from $50,000 to $1 million for cor-
porations and $100,000 for other persons, and increasing maximum
criminal imprisonment from one year to three years. 63 State antitrust en-
forcement agencies can use these increased penalties to deter violations en-
compassed by the Sherman Act. One year later, Congress enacted the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,64 which repealed federal authoriza-
tion of state laws allowing "fair trade" vertical price-fixing agreements.
This enables the state to attack anticompetitive behavior that previously
could be protected. 65 In addition to these important changes, two other re-
cent congressional enactments remain the most significant for state anti-
trust purposes-the Crime Control Act of 197666 and the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.67
For most states, the Crime Control Act has been the biggest stimulant
that state antitrust enforcement has ever received. The Act created a $30
million, three-year federal funding program for state antitrust enforce-
ment agencies. 68 The purpose of the program was to provide funds for the
63. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970)).
64. Pub. L. No. 94-145, §§ 2-4, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1970)).
65. The Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 and the McGuire Act of 1952 permitted
states to allow manufacturers to set minimum resale prices for their products by
the states enacting "fair trade laws." This provided an exemption for activity that
had otherwise been found to be an antitrust violation. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (minimum resale price is per se il-
legal). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Compare Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) with United States v. General Elec. Co., 272
U.S. 476 (1926). Through enactment of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1975, Congress repealed from the federal antitrust laws all language authorizing
states to enact fair trade laws.
During consideration of the bill in Congress, Rep. BarbaraJordon stated that
the existence of fair trade laws meant "at least $2 billion additional cost to con-
sumers." 724 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (July 29, 1975).
Senator Edward Brooke quoted from a 1970Justice Department study indicating
that fair trade laws increased retail prices as much as 37% on many items.
Senator Brooke also cited testimony of the California Attorney General where it
was stated that California consumers lost $6.5 billion annually because of fair
trade laws. 742 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 9, 1975). See
generally Engman, Case for Repealing "Fair Trade," 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV., No. 4, at 79 (1975).
66. Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2415 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 3739
(1976)).
67. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394-95 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§
15c-15f (1976)).
68. 122 CONG. REC. 23670-72 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Morgan).
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development in each state of a viable, self-sustaining, in-house antitrust
enforcement program.6 9 To date, $21 million has been awarded to forty-
five states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; the State of Missouri
has received $489,050.70
This "seed money" has funded the creation of an antitrust unit in the
attorney general's offices in twenty-five states that previously had none.71
Overall, the grant program has added 267 persons to state antitrust of-
fices, including ninety-nine full-time attorneys. 72 These federal funds have
helped the State of Missouri staff its Antitrust Division with four full-time
attorneys and one paralegal.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 has pro-
vided for cooperation between state enforcement units and federal
enforcement units by allowing the state attorneys general access to infor-
mation concerning violations under federal investigation. This Act adds
section 4F to the Clayton Act. 73 The new section provides for two types of
disclosures to state attorneys general -mandatory disclosures and
disclosures made on request. The mandatory disclosure provision, subsec-
tion (a), states that whenever the United States Attorney General has
brought an action under the antitrust laws and has reason to believe that a
69. Id. Senator Morgan remarked:
[T]his amendment will improve that situation, and it will do so in a man-
ner agreeable to all those of us who believe strongly in principles of
States' rights. The States are ideally situated to protect the rights of the
consumer, the small businessman, and the honest businessman of any
size. By means of this amendment, we will give the States the funds to
make a beginning.
Id. at 23672. A spokesman for the National Association of Attorneys General con-
cluded:
These federal funds are seeds being planted in the fields of the 50 states
where antitrust will spring forth and grow to maturity. Our free enter-
prise system will be made a bit more free and price fixers will have a
graver risk of being caught. Antitrust violations which injure small
businessmen and consumers in a small locality are much more likely to
be protected with the explosive growth in antitrust enforcement resulting
from the planting of these seeds.
830 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-2 (Sept. 15, 1977).
70. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST
REVOLVING FUNDS 1-3 (March 1978). Release of the remaining $9 million is in
dispute. The Justice Department's position is that the intent of Congress to estab-
lish a three-year seed money program has been satisfied and that the states can
now sustain their antitrust programs with state appropriations alone. 895 AN-
TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-3 (Jan. 4, 1979).
71. 830 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-2 (Sept. 15, 1977).
72. Project, supra note 7, at 592.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 15f (1976).
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state attorney general would be entitled to bring an action based on
substantially the same alleged violation of the antitrust laws, he shall
promptly give written notification thereof to the state attorney general.7 4
The provision concerning disclosures made on request, subsection (b),
provides that the United States Attorney General shall, on request by a
state attorney general, make available to him, to the extent permitted by
law, any investigative files or other materials which are or may be relevant
to an actual or potential cause of action under the antitrust laws.7"
Despite the mandatory nature of subsection (a), the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division has made sparing use of the provision. 76 Subsec-
tion (b) has been invoked several times by the states.77 TheJustice Depart-
ment has drafted guidelines for both types of disclosures to meet the pur-
pose of the statute, while at the same time ensuring against broad and
premature disclosures of information.78 The legislative history of the
statute has been interpreted by the Justice Department as suggesting that
certain materials, such as those produced in response to a CID, are
precluded from disclosure.7 9
74. 15 U.S.C. § 15f(a) (1976). The disclosure provisions of§ 15f apply only
where there exists an actual or potential cause of action under the Clayton Act.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976).
76. Project, supra note 7, at 596. See also 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) D-7 (Dec. 7, 1978).
77. Project, supra note 7, at 596.
78. See 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-7 (Dec. 7, 1978).
Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield, then head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the United States Justice Department, stated:
It is our view that Section 4F(a) of the [Clayton] Act contemplates
more than routine notice to the states of federal antitrust actions. In-
stead, it requires the Antitrust Division to make a judgment on the ap-
propriateness of notification along certain lines. Among the factors we
will consider will be: the factual circumstances of the alleged violation,
the posture of the state as a potential damage claimant under existing
law, and, generally, the likely effect of the alleged violation on cogniz-
able state interests.
- Section 4F(b) is also a valuable aid .... Our goal is to support the
overall effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, whether through state or
federal actions, and the idea behind our guidelines is to strike the re-
quired balance between disclosure and confidentiality that best achieves
this.
Id.
79. Project, supra note 7, at 596. See also 822 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) D-2 (July 14, 1977). For the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 15f
(1976), see H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2586.
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The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 adds yet
another apparently powerful legislative weapon to the arsenal of state an-
titrust enforcement agencies-parens pat rie actions.80 The parens
patriae provisions authorize state attorneys general to secure monetary
relief on behalf of natural persons reciding in the state who have been in-
jured by violations of the antitrust laws. 1The purpose of the parens
patriae legislation was to create an effective recourse for injured con-
sumers of low-cost items.8 2
Previously, consumers of low-cost items were thought to be without an
effective antitrust remedy. 83 In such cases, the cost of initiating and con-
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
81. Id. This section codifies the common law established in Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1944), where the United States Supreme Court
recognized the authority of the state to sue as parens patriae for violations of the
antitrust laws if seeking injunctive relief. The Court said:
[The state] as a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong,
which if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her in-
dustries, retards her development, and relegates her to an inferior
economic position among her sister States. These are matters of grave
public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of par-
ticular individuals who may be affected.
Id. at 451: The need for legislative revision judicially was acknowledged in
California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973), where the court ruled that the Clayton Act did not authorize
recovery of damages in parens patriae actions, but nonetheless invited legislative
action to change the situation. The court said, "[I]f the state is to be empowered
to act in the fashion here sought we feel that authority must come not through
judicial improvisation but by legislation. . . ." Id.
82. H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2573-74. The House Committee on theJudiciary
reported:
Although the antitrust laws have the immediate goals of protecting
and promoting competition, it is the consuming public that ultimately
benefits from the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Nonetheless,
Federal antitrust statutes do not presently provide effective redress for
the injury inflicted upon consumers. This lack of an effective consumer
remedy sometimes results in the unjust enrichment of antitrust violators
and undermines the deterrent effect of the treble damage action....
[The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976] fills this
gap by providing the consumer an advocate in the enforcement pro-
cess-his State attorney general.
Id. See generally Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as
Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976); Hill, The Present and Future
Status of Parens Patriae Litigation from the Plaintiffs Viewpoint, 47 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1375 (1979); Comment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble
Damages, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 328 (1977).
83. See Project, supra note 7, at 598.
1981]
15
Ashcroft: Ashcroft: Renewed Commitment to State Antitrust Enforcement
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
ducting a private antitrust suit generally far outweighed the potential
recovery to a single consumer, i.e., while the total monetary damage
resulting from an illegal restraint of trade oftentimes is large, the damage
to each individual consumer often is comparatively small.84 Consumers
had found little relief by way of class actions under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure due to the burdensome requirements of Rule 23.85
84. H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2575-76. The House Committee on the Judiciary
reported:
Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, any person, including any consumer, who
can prove he was injured by price-fixing or any other antitrust violation,
has a cause of action. In most instances, however, an individual law suit
by an injured consumer is, as a practical matter, out of the question. If,
for example, a price-fixing conspiracy results in an overcharge of a
dollar on a relatively low priced consumer item, and 50 million such
items are sold, the aggregate impact of the conspiracy upon consumers
and the illegal profits of the price-fixers are not insignificant- at least
$50 million. Yet no single consumer could practically be expected to
bring suit. He would have no investigative resources - or incentive - to
discover the conspiracy; should he become aware of the overcharge, he
will almost certainly have no proof that he purchased the item at a par-
ticular time, place and price; he will quite obviously have neither the in-
centive nor the resources to engage in protracted and extremely costly
litigation to recover his tiny individual stake.
Id. Successful parens patriae actions by the State of Missouri have involved, for
the most part, the retail sale of gasoline. For a discussion of some of these cases,
see notes 238-45 and accompanying text infra.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The rule establishes four prerequisites to the forma-
tion of a class: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class. Id. 23(a).
Rule 23 also imposes requirements of notice and manageability. Many courts
have found that large consumer classes predicated on small individual claims
present insurmountable problems of manageability in the conduct of the litiga-
tion, especially with respect to proper notice. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. American
Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), the United States Supreme Court interpreted Rule 23 as requiring class
action plaintiffs to provide individual prelitigation notice to all identifiable
members of the class regardless of the cost of providing such notice. The plaintiff
in Eisen had claimed personal damages of only $70 while seeking to represent a
class of as many as 6 million persons who allegedly were injured as a result of the
same violations of the antitrust and securities laws. It was estimated that the cost
of giving individual notice to all identifiable members of the class would approx-
imate $315,000. The Court, in ruling that the prohibitive cost did not excuse the
need for plaintiff to give notice, effectively eliminated the Rule 23 class action as a
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Under parens patriae, the state can sue on behalf of those consumers
for whom individual suits would not be economical. The Act provides that
monetary recovery in a parens patriae action is to be distributed to the in-
jured consumers in such a manner as the district court may authorize or be
deemed a civil penalty by the court and deposited with the state as general
revenue.8 6 Both distribution methods are subject to the requirement that
each injured consumer must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
secure his appropriate portion of the net monetary recovery.87 It is also im-
portant to note that if injured persons wish to exclude themselves from the
parens patriae action, they may do so and thereby avoid the res judicata ef-
fect of the action.88
One of the most innovative aspects of the parens patriae legislation is
its provision on computation of damages. Under the Act, the state may
prove and assess damages in the aggregate by statistical or sampling
methods, by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by other reason-
able systems of estimating aggregate damages as the court may permit.8 9
The state does not have to prove separately the individual claim of, or
amount of damage to, each injured person on whose behalf the suit was
brought;90 this would be a practicably impossible task.
Attempts have been made to declare the parens patriae legislation un-
constitutional. Attacks generally have focused on the argument that no ar-
ticle III case or controversy exists since the state, as the plaintiff, was not
injured, or on the argument that article II prohibits the state from pursu-
feasible means for recovery by a large class of individuals where each sustains
relatively minor damages. See generally Comment, Manageability of Notice and
Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1971);
Symposium on Antitrust Class Actions, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1972).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 15e (1976).
87. Id. See Hill, supra note 82, at 1379. Recovery under these actions can be
significant. To illustrate, the State of Colorado brought a parens patriae action
six months after passage of a new antitrust statute. The action was against seven
retail petroleum outlets in a small community of approximately 4,000 residents.
Even though the state was limited to seeking damages for the six-month time
period that the statute had been effective, the recovery in the case returned ap-
proximately $75 per household to each claimant in the area.
88. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(b)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1981). This section provides
protection for the potential claimant's interest in prosecuting his own action. Any
person can exclude his claim from the parens patriae action by filing notice of in-
tent to do so within 60 days after the original notice of the suit has been given.
Failure to file such a notice of intent within the time allowed will result in a poten-
tial claimant being bound by the result of the parens patriae case.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
90. Id. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2585-86.
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ing a federally created civil penalty. Both arguments have been rejected
by the courts.91
Despite the apparent attractiveness of the parens patriae action for
state attorneys general, the power has been little used. 92 One reason for
this sparse use is the dampening effect of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,93 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers have
no right to recover damages for illegal price-fixing arrangements. 94 In Il-
linois Brick, the defendant company, acting under a horizontal price-fix-
ing agreement, sold bricks to various contractors; the contractors subse-
quently used the bricks in buildings constructed for the state. The State of
Illinois sued the Illinois Brick Company alleging that the state was injured
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act because of the illegal
overcharges resulting from the price fix which were passed on to the state
by way of the contractors. This allegation was based on an offensive use of
the "pass-on" theory. 95 A defensive use of the pass-on theory already had
91. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litigation MDL 150, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,495 (C.D. Cal.)
(rejected the argument that no case and controversy existed, making the parens
patriae action an encroachment on the President's article II power to enforce the
nation's laws); In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F.
Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978) (rejected the argument that there exists no article III case
or controversy because the state itself was not injured). See generally Hill, supra
note 82, at 1376; Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1977).
92. In the year following passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, only four parens patriae actions were recorded: Col-
orado v. Valley Petroleum Co., No. 77-352 (D. Colo., filed Aug. 22, 1977)
(charging seven oil companies with fixing prices of retail gasoline); Maryland v.
Jack Foley Realty, Inc., No. 77-618 (D. Md., filed April 22, 1977) (charging
Maryland real estate brokers with price fixing); Ohio v. Klosterman's French
Baking Co., No. 75-338 (S.D. Ohio, filed May 23, 1977) (charging the defendant-
bakeries with price fixing); Arizona v. Standard Oil, No. 76-3247 (C.D. Cal., fil-
ed Feb. 7, 1977) (charging twelve oil companies with conspiracy to create an ar-
tificial scarcity of crude oil and refined products).
93. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
94. Id. at 728.
95. "Passing-on" occurs when a businessperson who has been overcharged
for an item adjusts his own price upward to reflect that overcharge. An offensive
use of the pass-on theory would permit plaintiffs who have not purchased directly
from an antitrust violator to recover for the illegal overcharge passed on to them
by middlepersons. A defensive use of the pass-on theory would permit the
defendant-violator to stop a direct purchaser from recovering when the direct
purchaser had passed on the illegal overcharges to indirect purchasers of the
defendant; it is alleged that the direct purchaser has not actually been injured.
See McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to
Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 177 (1971);
Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic
and LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1975).
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been denied in the Court's earlier opinion of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp. 96 Reasoning from Hanover Shoe, the Court denied
recovery to the State of Illinois. 97
96. 392 U.S. 481, 488 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, a shoe manufacturer sued
United Shoe Machinery Corp. under § 4 of the Clayton Act alleging that United
Shoe's policy of leasing, rather than selling, shoemaking machinery violated § 2 of
the Sherman Act. United Shoe asserted as a defense that the plaintiff had suffered
no legally cognizable injury, arguing that any economic damage had been
passed on by plaintiff to its purchasers by increased shoe prices. The Court re-
jected the pass-on defense and held that a direct purchaser is entitled to recovery,
even if damages have been passed on by overcharges. Id. at 494.
97. The result of Illinois Brick is that generally the pass-on theory cannot be
used offensively or defensively. The Court found that the principle basis for the
decision in Hanover Shoe was that allowing a defensive use of the pass-on theory
would result in complexity and uncertainty because of the need to analyze pricing
decisions. The Court concluded that the same problems would occur if the pass-
on theory was used offensively. The Court said, "[T]he attempt to trace the com-
plex economic adjustments to a change in the cost of a particular factor of pro-
duction would greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already
protracted treble-damages proceedings . . . ." 431 U.S. at 732.
The Court also feared that both direct and indirect purchasers would recover
treble damages for the full amount of the original illegal overcharge if an offen-
sive use of the pass-on theory'was used, but a defensive use was not possible. The
Court stated:
Even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part
of an overcharge passed on to it, the direct purchaser would still recover
automatically the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect pur-
chaser had shown to be passed on; similarly, following an automatic
recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser, the indirect pur-
chaser could sue to recover the same amount.
Id. at 730. Having decided that Hanover Shoe should not be overruled, the
possibility of a double recovery if an offensive pass-on theory were allowed led to a
rejection of the offensive use. Id.
The Court referred to two specific exceptions to its holding-situations where
an indirect purchaser might bring a treble damages action. The first is the "cost-
plus contract" exception, initially enunciated in Hanover Shoe. InHanover Shoe,
the Court cited as an example where a pass-on defense might be permitted, the
situation where "an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract,
thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged." 392 U.S. at 494. In
Illinois Brick, the Court specifically adopted the cost-plus contract exception
stating that "the pre-existing cost-plus contract makes easy the normally com-
plicated task of demonstrating that the overcharge has not been absorbed by the
direct purchaser." 431 U.S. at 732 n.12. Second, the Court referred to an owner-
ship or control exception, implying that where a defendant-supplier owns or con-
trols the intermediary in a vertical chain of distribution, an indirect purchaser
may recover from the supplier. The Court simply stated, "Another situation in
which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be per-
mitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Id.
at 736 n.16. The Court's use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that control alone
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Illinois Brick has serious consequences for the use of the parens patriae
action. Most consumers are indirect purchasers.9, If Illinois Brick is read
broadly, use of the parens patriae power would be limited to the small
number of cases where the consumers are direct purchasers, the only cases
where the consumer would have a cause of action for the state to pursue. 99
Some commentators have argued that Illinois Brick should have no ap-
plication to theparenspatriae power of state attorneys general. 1 00 The ma-
jority in Illinois Brick, however, seemed to indicate otherwise. The Court
said, "Congress made clear.., that... [theparenspatriae] legislation did
would be sufficient to invoke this exception. See generally Note, Scaling the Il-
linois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 309 (1978).
98. Anticompetitive activity often occurs at the manufacturing level in the
chain of distribution. The consumer rarely deals directly with the manufacturer,
but purchases from a retailer, i.e., consumers are indirect purchasers of the
manufacturer. It should be noted, however, that the term "indirect purchasers" is
by no means limited to consumers. It refers to any purchaser who is removed one
or more steps from the violator in the chain of distribution. See generally Note,
supra note 97.
99. Theparenspatriae provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976), as amend-
ed by Act of Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1157, allow state at-
torneys general to enforce only the existing rights of consumers and do not create
a new cause of action. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 734 n.14. In many cases,
consumers would be indirect purchasers and would not have a cause of action for
damages under the Illinois Brick doctrine. Thus, the state could not bring a
parens patriae action on their behalf. See Project, supra note 7, at 602.
It is possible, however, that the doctrine of Illinois Brick will be narrowed
significantly by subsequent judicial interpretation. One possibility is that the doc-
trine will be limited to horizontal restraints of trade as found in Illinois Brick.
Furthermore, the doctrine could be limited to only the type of horizontal price
fixing found in Illinois Brick. See Note, supra note 97, at 331.
The argument that Illinois Brick will be narrowed judicially seems to have
been given credibility by the recent decision in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330 (1979). In Reiter, the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
held that a consumer who pays a higher price for goods purchased for personal
use as a result of antitrust violations sustains an injury to "property" within the
meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. The argument that the language "business or
property" in § 4 required an injury to both a business interest and a property in-
terest was rejected. The plaintiff inReiter was an indirect purchaser. On remand,
the district court held that the plaintiff could recover damages, reasoning that by
its remand the Court must have intended to limit Illinois Brick to cases where
there were horizontal restraints, i.e., Illinois Brick should not apply to a vertical
price-fixing case as found in Reiter. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115,
120 (D. Minn. 1980). For a discussion of Reiter, see notes 187-200 and accompa-
nying text infra.
100. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 82, at 1376-77; Note, supra note 97, at 325.
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not alter the definition of which overcharged persons were injured within
the meaning of § 4. It simply created a new procedural device-parens
patriae actions by States on behalf of their citizens-to enforce existing
rights of recovery under § 4."101
The Court did invite Congress, if it disagreed with the decision, to pro-
vide clear directives to the contrary.' 02 Congress began that process in May
1978, when the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that "[t]he loss of
private damage actions on behalf of indirect purchasers has an intolerable
impact upon antitrust enforcement .... ",03 passed to the floor of the
Senate an anti-Illinois Brick statute designed to obviate the effect of the
1978 decision.'" The National Association of Attorneys General,
Missouri, and other states have been lobbying actively for its passage.
Nevertheless, the fate of such legislation no longer seems promising. Relief
for the parens patriae action may be limited to the possibility of a narrow
judicial interpretation of Illinois Brick by its authors.105
101. 431 U.S. at 734 n.14.
102. The Court issued its directive by saying:
We recognize that direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bring-
ing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with their sup-
pliers. But on balance, and until there are clear directions from Congress
to the contrary, we conclude that the legislative purpose in creating a
group of "private attorneys general" to enforce the antitrust laws under §
4 .... is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the
full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to appor-
tion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it.
Id. at 746 (citation omitted).
103. S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
104. Id. at 36. The proposed legislation read:
Sec. 3. The Clayton Act is amended by inserting immediately afier sec-
tion 4H the following new section:
Sec. 41.
(1) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act,
the fact that a person or the United States has not dealt directly
with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant
shall be entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a
damage claim, that the plaintiff has passed on to others, who
are themselves entitled to recover under section 4, 4A, or 4C of
this Act, some or all of what would otherwise constitute plain-
tiffs damage.
105. See note 99 supra. For a discussion of the exceptions to Illinois Brick, see
note 97 supra.
Regardless of the outcome of the Illinois Brick legislation, parens patriae still
serves a purpose in state antitrust enforcement. It is a power that has been and
will continue to be utilized by the State of Missouri.
One bright note for the future of parens patriae is the failure of the National
Association of Realtors to convince various state legislatures to take the parens
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III. STATE INVOLVEMENT AS PLAINTIFF IN TREBLE DAMAGES
LITIGATION AND OTHER ACTIONS UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
A major trend in state antitrust enforcement today is state involvement
as plaintiff in treble damages actions under the federal antitrust laws.' 0
Increased activity on the part of the states in treble damages litigation is
largely a result of state governments becoming major purchasers of com-
modities. As previously stated, in fiscal year 1978 total state government
expenditures were $180 billion, eight percent of the gross national prod-
uct.o10 A 1977 study revealed the frequency of antitrust litigation involving
purchases made by state governments: out of 307 cases initiated by state
antitrust enforcement agencies during the period studied, 101, thirty-
three percent, involved the state in its procurement capacity. 108
A. Multidistrict Treble Damages Litigation
Multidistrict litigation has proved to be the most rewarding vehicle
used by states to recover losses incurred in their procurement capacities.
The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968109 provides that civil actions in-
volving one or more common questions of fact may be transferred to a
single federal district court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. 0 Transfer may be initiated by any party to the action with an
application to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation or by the
Panel itself."' The usual procedure is for a state to seek consolidation
patriae power away from their attorneys general pursuant to § 4h of the Clayton
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15h (1976). Such efforts were undertaken in Colorado, New
Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas. Each of these efforts was unsuccessful. 811
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-7 (April 28, 1977). In 1977 the
Missouri Association of Realtors initiated a lobbying effort for such legislation in
Missouri. After a meeting with the Attorney General's Office, however, the
Association determined that such legislation "would not be in the best interest of
Missouri." 844 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Dec. 22, 1977).
106. See Miles, supra note 7, at 1348; Project, supra note 7, at 580. See
generally Rubin, supra note 6.
107. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 8.
108. Project, supra note 7, at 579.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
110. Id. See Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
72 F.R.D. 211 (1977); Herndon, Section 1407 and Antitrust Multidistrict Litiga-
tion-The First Decade, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1161 (1979); Levy, Complex
Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 41 (1971);
Peterson & McDermott, Multidistrict Litigation: New Forms ofJudicialAdminis-
tration, 56 A.B.A.J. 737 (1970).
111. Transfers will be granted on a determination that the "transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will pro-
mote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
This procedure significantly benefits both plaintiffs and defendants in that all
save the cost of litigating each individual suit, i.e., plaintiffs share the cost of
bringing the suit and defendants only have to defend the suit once.
[Vol. 46
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where suit has been initiated first by the federal government. There are
some instances, however, where the states have taken the lead and the
federal government has followed." 2
One reason for the widespread use of multidistrict litigation among
state antitrust enforcement units is the significant sums that commonly are
awarded in the combined effort."13 Another reason is the comparative low
cost and convenience of participating in multidistrict litigation. These fac-
tors enable small state antitrust agencies to participate in complex and ex-
pensive cases." 4
The decision of Illinois Brick is confronted again, imposing obstacles
to the effective use of multidistrict litigation. State governments frequently
relate to violating manufacturers as indirect purchasers because they buy
from wholesalers or retailers instead of directly from the manufacturers. 115
As earlier stated, read most broadly, Illinois Brick bars indirect purchasers
from recovering monetary damages under the Clayton Act. 116
The consequences of Illinois Brick can be severe for governments in-
jured when acting in their procurement capacity. Shortly after the deci-
sion, Assistant United States Attorney GeneralJohn H. Shenefield spoke to
the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, concluding that the Illinois Brick rul-
ing could cost the federal government close to $205 million that it might
otherwise have recovered in just three federal suits pending at the time."17
The states were expected to lose initially as much as $500 million in poten-
tial recoveries." 8 In 1977 Senators Strom Thurmond and Paul Laxalt
sought and received information from nineteen different states which in-
dicated that out of 203 actions involving the states' governmental procure-
ment interests over a period of ten years, states were indirect purchasers in
119 cases, fifty-eight percent of the time."19 The states were direct pur-
chasers in only fifty-three actions, twenty-six percent of the time.120 In
thirty-one actions, fifteen percent, the states were acting as both direct
and indirect purchasers. 121 In the time period studied by Senators Thur-
mond and Laxalt, the State of Missouri was an indirect purchaser in eight
112. See, e.g., In re Government Auto Fleet Sales Antitrust Litigation MDL
65, 352 F. Supp. 966 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
113. The example cited most frequently is the tetracycline litigation that
resulted in a settlement of $100 million. See West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
114. See Project, supra note 7, at 581.
115. See note 98 supra.
116. See notes 93-105 and accompanying text supra.
117. 824 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10 (July 28, 1977).
118. See S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
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out of ten procurement actions. 22 The results of the survey revealed that
in nearly seventy-five percent of the governmental procurement actions
during the previous ten years, the states would have been barred from ob-
taining recovery under a broad reading of Illinois Brick. 123
Illinois Brick aside, multidistrict litigation continues to be an excellent
vehicle for state antitrust enforcement units to obtain large recoveries
while eliminating the illegal restraints of trade that occur in governmental
procurements. Five recent multidistrict actions in which the State of
Missouri joined with other states as plaintiffs to recover damages for losses
suffered in their procurement capacity illustrate these benefits.
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation124 was a multidistrict action con-
sisting of thirty-three separate civil actions for treble damages and injunc-
tive relief filed against the National Broiler Marketing Association
(NBMA) and forty-three processors and growers of chickens. The thirty-
three civil suits, including a class action filed by the State of Missouri on
behalf of its governmental agencies, were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for consolidation. It
commonly was alleged that since October 1970, the defendants had
violated the federal antitrust laws by engaging in a combination and con-
spiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices of broiler chickens at
noncompetitive, artifically high levels and to artificially limit the produc-
tion of broiler chickens.
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation grew out of a civil antitrust action
brought by the federal government in 1973 against the NBMA, where it
was alleged that its members and others had combined to fix broiler
chicken prices and to restrict broiler chicken production. 12 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the
federal government's complaint on the ground that NBMA's members
were farmers as defined in the Capper-Volstead Act' 26 and were,
therefore, immune from the antitrust laws under that Act. 2 7 The federal
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. MDL 237, No. 74-2454A (N.D. Ga. 1978) (settlement agreement).
125. United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n, [1975] 2 Trade Gas.
(CCH) 67,219 (N.D. Ga.), rev'd, 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977), affd, 436 U.S.
816 (1978).
126. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
127. The Capper-Volstead Act provides, in part:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock .... in
interstate and foreign commerce .... Such associations may have mar-
keting agencies in common; and such associations and their members
may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such pur-
poses ....
Id. See generally Note, Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of
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government appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 28 The State of Missouri joined with fifteen other
states in submitting a brief as amicus curiae. The court of appeals reversed
the decision of the district court and held that the NBMA members were
not farmers as defined by the Capper-Volstead Act and, thus, were not im-
mune from antitrust prosecution. 29 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the opinion of the court of appeals. 30
As a result of their loss to the federal government on appeal, the defen-
dants decided to settle with the several plaintiffs in the civil multidistrict
litigation. The settlement, reached in 1978, was for approximately $35
million, with the state government-plaintiffs receiving approximately
$3,290,000; the State of Missouri recovered $75,000.13'
In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation'32 was a multidistrict action
consisting of more than 100 civil actions, including actions by the State of
Missouri and several other states, transferred for consolidation to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The
litigation began for Missouri in January 1977, when Missouri's Antitrust
Division brought a class action on behalf of the state and various local
governmental entities within the state against certain companies engaged
in the sale of refined sugar. 33 It was alleged that the defendants conspired
to violate the antitrust laws by engaging in concerted action to fix the
prices at which refined sugar was to be sold to the governmental entities.
Following consolidation, the defendants challenged the right of
Missouri's Attorney General to represent the class in the suit-a common
challenge by defendants in multidistrict actions. The district court ruled
that the State of Missouri, acting through the Attorney General, could
represent a statewide class of governmental entity-purchasers of refined
sugar.134 In 1977 a settlement was reached in the litigation for $1,015,000;
the State of Missouri recovered $99,977.50.135
Antitrust Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341 (1975).
128. United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1380 (5th
Cir. 1977), affd, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
129. 550 F.2d at 1390.
130. 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
131. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation MDL 237, No. 74-2454A (N.D., Ga.
1978) (settlement agreement). See MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, AN-
TITRUST DIVISION, SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES (1980) (on file at Missouri Attorney
General's Office) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES].
132. MDL 301, No. 76-141 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (settlement agreement).
133. Missouri v. Great Western Sugar Co., No. 77-192 (W.D. Mo. 1977)
(transferred to S.D. Cal.).
134. In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation MDL 301, No. 76-141 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (settlement agreement).
135. Id. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
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The State of Missouri recovered its largest sum of money through the
multidistrict action of In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation."6 The case
had its origins in a 1969 suit filed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department against the four major manufacturers of master key systems in
the United States. 13 7 It was alleged that the four defendants and other con-
spirators had engaged in an unlawful combination and conspiracy con-
sisting of agreements among distributors of each manufacturer not to sell
master key systems outside the territories allocated to them by the
manufacturers, not to compete with other distributors of the manufac-
turer for which one acted, and not to bid on master key systems when the
original system was sold by another distributor of the manufacturer for
which one acted.
Subsequent to the Justice Department's filing of the suit, numerous
states, including Missouri, filed class actions on behalf of their respective
political subdivisions against the same four manufacturers of master key
systems. These civil suits were transferred for consolidation to the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The defendants
ultimately reached a settlement with the state-plaintiffs in 1979; the State
of Missouri recovered $296,098.62. l 38
In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation'"9 began with indictments
brought by the Justice Department in 1977 against Wells Fargo, Inc. and
Brink's, Inc., armored car service companies, and six of their executives.
The indictments were based on charges that from 1968 to 1974, Wells
Fargo and Brink's conspired to restrain trade by dividing the armored car
service market between them and by submitting collusive, non-
competitive, rigged bids and price quotations. 140
While the indictments against Wells Fargo and Brink's were pending,
numerous civil class actions were filed by various states, including
Missouri, seeking to recover illegal overcharges arising out of the alleged
restraints of trade. Many of these actions were transferred to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to form In re Ar-
mored Car Antitrust Litigati6n.
In the federal criminal action, the defendant companies eventually
entered no-contest pleas.' 4 ' Brink's was ordered to pay a fine of $625,000
and Wells Fargo a fine of $375,000.142 In addition, the court accepted no-
136. MDL 45, No. 75-7386 (D. Conn. 1979) (settlement agreement).
137. United States v. Emhart Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 88,098 (D.
Conn.).
138. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation MDL 45, No. 75-7386 (D. Conn.
1979) (settlement agreement). See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
139. MDL 318, No. 78-139A (N.D. Ga. 1978) (settlement agreement).
140. See United States v. Brink's, Inc., [1978] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,900
(N.D. Ga.).
141. United States v. Brink's, Inc., No. 77-207A (N.D. Ga. 1978).
142. Id.
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/1
STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
contest pleas from the president of Wells Fargo and a vice-president of
Brink's. ' Both individuals were fined $20,000; each was placed on proba-
tion for one year. '"Subsequent to the criminal proceedings, the district
court approved a settlement to the civil multidistrict litigation in the sum
of $11,800,000; in 1979 the State of Missouri received $9,400.'4
Still pending is the multidistrict litigation of In re Cement and Con-
crete Antitrust Litigation.16 In September 1978, the State of Missouri
filed a class action suit against Portland Cement Associates and fourteen
cement companies. 4 7 It was alleged that the defendants conspired to
reduce and eliminate competition in the sale of cement, to increase the
price of cement, and to establish a system of pricing which would result in
uniform mill delivery prices. In addition, it was alleged that the defen-
dants had conspired to allocate customers and territories, to restrict the
territories within which purchasers of cement could utilize the cement they
purchased, and to establish agreed-on categories of customers to whom the
cement would be sold.
The State of Missouri sought and obtained transfer of its civil suit to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Arizona for
consolidation with several other civil actions filed against the defendants.
The court allowed consolidation in spite of arguments that the Missouri
case was more factually limited in scope than the other transferred civil ac-
tions. To date, there has been a settlement with one of the fourteen defen-
dant companies for $1,750,000; the amount of recovery for the State of
Missouri from this settlement is currently undetermined.48
B. Individual Actions Under Federal Law
It is quite clear that the multidistrict litigation procedure has pro-
duced great incentives for state antitrust enforcement. In the four cited
cases where final settlement has been reached, the State of Missouri has
recovered over $490,000 in damages.149 The trend in most states is to focus
on large multidistrict litigations to the exclusion of many other types of ac-
tions. 50 Missouri, however, has a policy of placing equal emphasis on in-
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation MDL 318, No. 78-139A (N.D.
Ga. 1978) (settlement agreement). See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
146. MDL 296, No. 76-448A (D. Ariz.) (pending).
147. Missouri v. Portland Cement Ass'n, No. 78-4192 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(transferred to D. Ariz.).
148. In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation MDL 296, No. 76-448A
(D. Ariz.) (pending). See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
149. See text accompanying notes 131, 135, 138 & 145 supra. It should be
noted, however, that the state can incur substantial costs in multidistrict actions.
While the cost of actual litigation is shared by the plaintiffs, there are additional
costs for travel and other matters.
150. See generally Miles, supra note 7.
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dividual enforcement actions to better protect the overall competitive en-
vironment of the state. Examples of such actions involving federal law are
Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc. 51 and Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp. "62
The State of Missouri commenced an action for injunctive relief
against the National Organization for Women (NOW) on February 28,
1978, in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri.153 The state alleged that NOW was engaging with others in an
unreasonable restraint of trade in the nature of a secondary boycott, in
violation of the Sherman Act, the Missouri Antitrust Law, and principles
of Missouri tort law which prohibit intentional infliction of economic
harm.
In 1972 the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)154 was submit-
ted to the legislatures of the states for ratification. At the commencement
of this action, only thirty-five state legislatures had ratified the amend-
ment, three short of the three-fourths of the states required by the Con-
stitution. The State of Missouri had not voted for ratification. 5 In
February 1977, NOW initiated a program of urging other organizations
not to hold conventions in states which had not ratified the ERA.156 The
impact of this convention boycott was such that Missouri motels and
restaurants catering to the convention trade and, consequently, the
Missouri economy as a whole, did suffer revenue losses.'" 7
In its complaint, the state alleged injury to itself and, as parens
patriae, to Missouri citizens. 3 8 District Judge Elmo Hunter found the
evidence sufficient to justify a finding that NOW had entered into a com-
151. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
152. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
153. Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D.
Mo. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
154. The proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.
620 F.2d at 1302 n. 1 (quoting text of Equal Rights Amendment).
155. Thirteen other states had not ratified the ERA at the time: Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Transcript on Ap-
peal, Vol. V, at 26, Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
289 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
156. 467 F. Supp. at 292.
157. Id. at 300.
158. Id. at 291.
[Vol. 46
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/1
STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
bination to implement a convention boycott of states which had not
ratified the ERA.1 5 9 The district judge also concluded that the State of
Missouri had standing as parens patriae to pursue the case on the merits
and seek injunctive relief under the antitrust laws. 6 0 Turning to the merits
of the case, the district judge declined to hold that the convention boycott
was in violation of the Sherman Act, the Missouri Antitrust Law, or prin-
ciples of Missouri tort law because of the boycott's political and noncom-
mercial nature. Judge Hunter stated that the convention boycott "takes
place in what is essentially a political context.... The participants are not
moved by any anticompetitive purpose; they are not in a competitive rela-
tionship.'' In addition, the judge expressed concern about the serious
questions relating to the first amendment right of petition if the Sherman
Act was applied to NOW's boycott campaign.16 2
The judgment of the district court was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 163 The majority relied on the
legislative history of the Sherman Act and guidance from the United States
Supreme Court with respect to that legislative history, 164 in deciding that
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to a politically
motivated economic boycott participated in and organized by non-
competitors of those who suffered as a result of the boycott. 65
The majority relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. 66 In Noerr, the
Supreme Court relied on the first amendment right to petition the govern-
ment in declining to apply the antitrust laws to situations covering
159. Id. at 296.
160. Id. at 301.
161. Id. at 304.
162. Id. at 304-05.
163. Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
164. In examining the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the court of ap-
peals reasoned that Congress clearly intended to preserve free and fair competi-
tion. The court found that it was not clear, however, whether Congress intended
to protect free and fair competition from political or social activities that have the
same effect on competition as the commercial activities of a trust. The court
found no indication in the legislative history of an intent to do so. After examin-
ing a lengthy exchange between Senators Sherman and George, the court con-
cluded that "the indication is that it was the competitors in commerce that
Senator Sherman had in mind as the concern of his bill, not noncompetitors
motivated socially or politically in connection with legislation." Id. at 1309.
See generally 1 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL AN-
TITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978); Letwin, Congress and the Sher-
man Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
165. 620 F.2d at 1309.
166. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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legitimate attempts to influence the legislative or executive process.' 6 7
Despite the several factual distinctions, 68s the court of appeals felt that the
considerations in Noerr made it clear that NOW's efforts to influence the
legislature's action on the ERA were beyond the scope and intent of the
Sherman Act. 169
The State of Missouri petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certioriari, but the Court declined to hear the case. 170 The reasons
for seeking certiorari were several. To begin with, NO W was the first ap-
pellate decision to include, within the first amendment right to petition
the government, protection for infliction of economic harm to private
businesses and citizens to obtain governmental action. Without analysis,
the court of appeals enunciated a new principle of constitutional law: an
economic boycott can be an exercise of the right to petition the govern-
ment. 171
In addition, the court of appeals majority severely strained the rule of
Noerr in applying it to NOW's boycott activities. The doctrine enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Noerr in effect established that one has a right to
petition the government for enactment of legislation or executive actions
that have an anticompetitive effect. 172 Under the Noerr rule, the govern-
ment is the actor causing the restraint of trade. NOW's activities were
clearly different; NOW was using anticompetitive methods to petition the
government to pass legislation-NOW was the actor causing the restraint
of trade, not the government.
The conclusion in Noerr is not surprising. Parker v. Brown,'" an
earlier Supreme Court decision, held that the Sherman Act does not pro-
hibit the anticompetitive actions of state governments. Thus, immunity
was given certain state action from antitrust prosecutions. 74 The state ac-
167. Id. at 136-38.
168. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
169. 365 F.2d at 1309.
170. Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
171. "[A]n infringement upon the people's right to petition the government
by a boycott should also not be lightly attributed to Congress." 620 F.2d at 1310.
"[T]he right to petition is of such importance that it is not an improper in-
terference even when exercised by way of a boycott." Id. at 1317.
172. 365 U.S. at 136. "We think it equally clear that the Sherman Act does
not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to per-
suade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a
law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly." Id.
173. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
174. Id. at 351. In Parker, the Court concluded that nothing in the language
or legislative history of the Sherman Act suggested that the Act was intended to
prevent a state or its officers or agents from conducting official business directed
by the state legislature. The Parker state action exemption applies to the
legislature and to anyone who is compelled to comply with legislative directives,
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tion defense, however, is not available to private parties who are utilizing
economically harmful means to achieve passage of legislation. The dissent
in NO W correctly indicated that Noerr "simply does not imply the conclu-
sion that the first amendment immunizes politically motivated boycotts
against antitrust attack."17 5
Another compelling reason for seeking certiorari was that the NOW
decision created a potentially disastrous exemption from the antitrust laws.
The court of appeals had sanctioned the use of economic injury to third
parties as a means to coerce legislatures into passing legislation that they
would not pass otherwise. The decision arguably has replaced a system of
government in which "legislatures ... are collectively responsible to the
popular wi,1176 with a system in which the legislature would be most sen-
sitive to those interest groups able to inflict the greatest economic suffering
on citizens of the state. In other words, NOW, realizing it had failed to
persuade the legislature on the merits, attempted to obtain ratification of
the ERA by economic pressure, and the court sanctioned such an approach
to government. 77
The significance of the court's endorsement of economic sanctions as
an additional and powerful weapon in the arsenal of various special in-
terest groups has not been ignored by such interest groups. Recently, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman,18 approved, as protected
first amendment expression, a concerted shutdown of retail gasoline
operators who were attempting, by that action, to raise prices for the retail
sale of gasoline by coercing the Department of Energy to modify existing
petroleum price regulations. 79 The purpose of the shutdown was
clear-infliction of sufficient suffering on the public so that the Depart-
even when such compliance results in restraints of trade. See generally Fox, The
Supreme Court and the Confusion Surrounding the State Action Doctrine, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 1571 (1980); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an An-
titrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV.
61 (1974).
The Parker state action exemption has been narrowed, however, by subse-
quent decisions. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976)
(plurality); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 731-37. See generally Shores, The State Action Doc-
trine After Goldfarb and Cantor, 63 IOWA L. REV. 367 (1977).
175. 620 F.2d at 1324 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
176. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
177. A NOW spokesperson stated, "We can convince with economic pressure
where we have failed with moral persuasion." Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 35, Missouri
v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), affd, 620
F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
178. 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d
Cir. 1980).
179. Id. at 768.
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ment would be forced to acquiesce to the conspirators' demands in order to
relieve the public's pain. 180
The import of NO W has not, however, been accepted by some courts.
NOW was rejected unequivocally by the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware in Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Seruice Sta-
tion Dealers Association. 8" The district court explicitly recognized that
NO W created an unreasonably broad exception to the antitrust laws. 182 It
remains to be seen whether the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit will follow the district court in Crown Central Petroleum or
the district court in Osborn.
Some of the most significant antitrust litigation that the State of
Missouri has been involved in arguably would result in different outcomes
following NOW. In Missouri v. Petroleum Retailers Organization, 3 the
state prevented a shutdown by gas station retailers who were attempting to
pressure the Department of Energy into regulation changes, just as the
defendants attempted to do in Crown Central Petroleum.184 In a series of
cases beginning with State v. Stephens, 185 the state enjoined the blockading
of barge and pipeline petroleum terminals by various truckers who were
attempting to coerce congressional changes in trucking tariffs. 186 All of
these cases involved politically motivated restraints of trade, i.e., the
defendants were attempting to coerce legislative action by imposing
economic pressure on the public. Arguably, NOW could prevent the state
from stopping such action.
Perhaps in Osborn or Crown Central Petroleum, or a similar case
which is less sensitive politically than NOW, the United States Supreme
Court will reject the NOW decision. Now that the federal courts clearly
have split on the antitrust consequences of a politically motivated
economic boycott, it is imperative that the Court give a ruling.
180. Id. at 762.
181. 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980).
182. Id. at 558 n.8. The district judge stated:
The conclusion which I reach is inconsistent with that reached by the
Eighth Circuit in State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women,
Inc ...... As I read the majority opinion in that case, an antitrust im-
munity would be available or not depending upon whether the motiva-
tion in seeking government action is "political" or "economic." I believe
such a rule to be both incapable of application and inconsistent with the
First Amendment case law.
Id. (citation omitted).
183. No. 77-4107 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (settlement agreement).
184. See notes 238-39 and accompanying text infra.
185. No. 379-330 (Cir. Ct., Scott Cty., Mo., July 5, 1979). See also State v.
Gabel, No. 425-088 (Cir. Ct., St. L. Cty., Mo., July 16, 1979); Statev. Smith, No.
679-26 (Cir. Ct., Cape Gir. Cty., Mo., July 5, 1979).
186. See notes 240-47 and accompanying text infra.
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One other example of the State of Missouri's willingness to participate
in cases, under federal antitrust laws, that present novel issues of impor-
tance is Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 187 Kathleen Reiter, on behalf of herself
and all other persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids
manufactured by five corporations, brought a class action in the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Reiter was seeking tre-
ble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging that because of
the corporations' violations of the antitrust laws, including vertical and
horizontal price fixing, she and all members of the class she represented
were forced to pay illegally fixed higher prices for hearing aids and related
services purchased from the corporations' retail dealers.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes treble damages actions by
"[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business orproperty by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.. .. ,,18The question presented
to the court was whether a consumer who purchases a product or service
for a nonbusiness (personal) use at a higher price because of an antitrust
violation suffers injury to his or her "business or property" within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act.18 9 The district court held that
under section 4, a retail purchaser is injured in "property" if the purchaser
can show that antitrust violations caused an increase in the price paid for
the article purchased and that an injury to property is sufficient to satisfy
section 4.190 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, ruling that retail purchasers also must allege a commercial or
business injury to meet the "business or property" standard.1 91
Reiter filed a petition for certiorari that was granted by the United
States Supreme Court in January 1979.192 The importance of the case to
the consumers of Missouri was obvious. The State of Missouri vigorously
worked with the State of Minnesota, where the case arose, and prepared a
brief as amicus curiae, which was joined by forty-seven other states.193
Missouri and Minnesota argued in the brief that the language of section 4
allows "any" person to recover, not just businesspersons, purchasers,
sellers, competitors, or persons who show a commercial injury.194 Also, it
was argued that an injury to "property" includes personal monetary loss,
187. 435 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn.), rev'd, 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
188. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
189. 435 F. Supp. at 934.
190. Id. at 935.
191. 579 F.2d at 1077.
192. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 439 U.S. 1065 (1979).
193. The only state not to join the amicus curiae brief was Georgia.
194. The states argued that the "[Clayton] Act is comprehensive in its terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of forbidden practices by
whomever they maybe perpetrated." Brief for A micus Curiae, Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
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relying on Justice Holmes' opinion in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta,195 where he stated that "[a] person whose property is
diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his
property.'1 96 Furthermore, the amicus curiae brief set out recent United
States Supreme Court decisions which recognized the standing of non-
business consumers in antitrust litigation.197
Based on these and other arguments, the Supreme Court, in an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Burger, reversed the court of appeals decision
and held that consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased for
personal use as a result of antitrust violations sustain an injury in their
"property" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 198 The
Court emphasized the disjunctive "or" in section 4 and held that a "proper-
ty" injury alone satisfied the statute. 199 Reiter represented a great victory
for consumers in all states and for the parens patriae power of the state at-
torneys general to recover on behalf of those citizens. 200
IV. STATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER STATE
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. CriminalActions
The use of criminal prosecutions at the state level is one of the more re-
cent and important trends in state antitrust enforcement. Congress reaf-
firmed its commitment to criminal sanctions in 1974 by increasing the
punishment for a violation of the Sherman Act from a misdemeanor to a
felony, by increasing the maximum penalties for individuals to three years
imprisonment and a $100,000 fine, and by increasing the maximum
penalty for corporations to a fine of $1 million. 20 1 Today, thirty-seven
195. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
196. Id. at 396.
197. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Court
allowed retail purchasers of private homes to challenge a minimum fee schedule
established by the state bar); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972)
(Court allowed the state to recover as "consumers in the marketplace" for "pay-
ment of money wrongfully induced"). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of In-
dia, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948).
198. 442 U.S. at 344.
199. Id. at 339.
200. For a discussion of the state's parenspatriae power, see notes 80-91 and
accompanying text supra. One should note the implications of Reiter on the Il-
linois Brick doctrine, a doctrine which seemed to weaken substantially the parens
patriae power. See notes 93-105 and accompanying text supra.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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states, including Missouri, have criminal antitrust statutes. 202 Four states
follow the Sherman Act for individual criminal fines, 203 while one state,
Maryland, has exceeded that amount, subjecting individuals to a
$500,000 fine.2 0 4 The rest of the states fall below the Sherman Act
monetary penalties. 20 5 Missouri has a maximum criminal fine of
202. ALA. CODE §§ 8-10-1 to -3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.562-.596
(1980); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16760 (West 1964 & Cum. Supp.
1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -108 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 542.15-.36 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1049
(1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 480-1 to -37 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE §§
48-101 to -119 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd 1977
& Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-1-1 to -2-12 (Burns 1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 553.1-.17 (West Cum. Supp.
1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-101 to -120 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:121-:152 (West 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1101-1107 (1980); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-201 to -213 (1975 &
Cum. Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, §§ 1-14 (West Cum. Supp.
1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.701-.767 (1967 & Cum. Supp.
1980-1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.49-.66 (Cum. Supp. 1981); RSMO §§
416.011-.161 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 51-501 to -506, -519 to -524
(Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-801 to -830 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 598A.010-.280 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 356:1-:14 (1966 & Supp.
1975); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1 to -19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-1-1 to -6 (1978); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney
1968 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -16 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 51-08-01 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1331.01-.99 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, §§ 1-7, 21-36
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.705-.836, .990 (1977); S.C. CODE §§ 39-3-10 to
-360 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-1-3.1 to -22 (1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 69-101 to -108 (1976); TEX. BUS. & COM-. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 15.01-.40
(Vernon 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-911 to -926
(Supp. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.01-.19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
See generally Inman, The Uniform State Antitrust Act: A Review and Com-
mentary, 14 AM. BUS. L.J. 171 (1976); Project, supra note 7.
203. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16755 (West 1964); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
480-16 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.280 (1973); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 341
(McKinney 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
204. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-212 (1975).
205. Alabama ($2,000 maximum); Alaska ($20,000 maximum); Colorado
($5,000 maximum); Florida ($5,000 maximum); Idaho ($5,000 maximum); Il-
linois ($50,000 maximum); Indiana ($5,000 maximum); Iowa ($1,000 max-
imum); Kansas ($1,000 maximum); Louisiana ($5,000 maximum); Maine
($2,500 maximum); Massachusetts ($25,000 maximum); Michigan ($1,000 max-
imum); Minnesota ($50,000); Mississippi ($10,000 maximum); Montana
($25,000 maximum); Nebraska ($5,000 maximum); New Hampshire ($1,000
maximum); New Jersey ($50,000); New Mexico ($1,000 maximum); North
Dakota ($1,000 maximum); Ohio ($1,000 maximum); Oklahoma ($10,000 max-
imum); Oregon ($1,000 maximum); South Carolina ($5,000); South Dakota
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$50,000.206 Thirty-three states authorize incarceration of individuals who
violate state antitrust laws.20 7 Missouri allows for imprisonment of up to
one year.2 08
Imprisonment of the individual antitrust offender is justified primarily
by its anticipated deterrent effect. The businessperson operates in a system
where he must maximize profits. Therefore, some operators in the
marketplace objectively will compare the estimated gains of competitive
activity with those of anticompetitive activity. Thi estimated gains of anti-
competitive behavior are determined by approximating the excess
revenues to be derived through the anitcompetitive activity and discount-
ing that excess by the risk of prosecution and fines. 20 9 In many instances,
the maximum fine is not as great as the expected excess revenues resulting
from anticompetitive activity. This may be especially true in our present
economy, which is experiencing both inflation and recession. Many
businesspersons find their costs increasing steadily while the demand for
their product is decreasing steadily. If the market operates freely, prices
should decrease as the demand decreases; yet such conditions could cause
severe losses for the businessperson who must meet the increased cost of
production. Thus, efforts to stabilize or raise prices become much more
likely.210 For these reasons, the added threat of imprisonment is necessary
($2,000 maximum); Tennessee ($5,000 maximum); Utah ($1,000 maximum);
Wisconsin ($50,000 maximum). See statutes cited note 202 supra.
206. RSMO § 416.051.1 (1978).
207. Alaska (one year maximum); California (three years maximum); Col-
orado (one year maximum); Florida (five years maximum); Georgia (five years
maximum); Hawaii (three years maximum); Idaho (one year maximum); In-
diana (ten years maximum); Iowa (one year maximum); Kansas (six months max-
imum); Louisiana (three years maximum); Maine (five years maximum);
Maryland (six months maximum); Massachusetts (one year maximum);
Michigan (two years maximum); Mississippi (five years maximum); Missouri (one
year maximum); Montana (one year maximum); Nebraska (one year maximum);
Nevada (six years maximum); New Hampshire (one year maximum); NewJersey
(three years maximum); New Mexico (one year maximum); New York (four years
maximum); North Carolina (no maximum); North Dakota (one year maximum);
Ohio (six months maximum); Oklahoma (ten years maximum); Oregon (one year
maximum); South Dakota (two years maximum); Tennessee (ten years max-
imum); Texas (ten years maximum); Utah (one year maximum); Wisconsin (five
years maximum). See statutes cited note 202 supra.
208. RSMO § 416.051.1 (1978). For a discussion of the Missouri criminal pro-
visions, see notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
209. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46
(1978) ("The business behavior which is likely to give rise to criminal antitrust
charges is conscious behavior normally undertaken only after a full consideration
of the desired results and a weighing of the costs, benefits, and risks."). See also K.
ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 63-77 (1976).
210. See, e.g., In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation MDL 296, No.
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to deter antitrust violations. 21 1 The deprivation of liberty, the discomfort
and danger of prison, and the humiliation of the criminal process and
criminal labeling are particularly unattractive to people in the business
community. 2 12 If potential imprisonment is only for a short period of time,
however, then the anticipated revenues to be gained from anticompetitive
behavior might outweigh even the cost of a jail term. To illustrate, a
former executive of a company convicted of price fixing stated his cost-
benefit analysis this way: "When you're doing $30 million a year and stand
to gain $3 million by fixing prices, a $30,000 fine doesn't mean much....
Face it, most of us would be willing to spend thirty days in jail to make a
few extra million dollars. Maybe if I were facing a year or more, I would
think twice." 213
Despite the apparent deterrent effect of imprisonment, history has
shown that it is a rarely used remedy. One report concludes that from 1890
to 1970 only nineteen individuals, exclusive of trade union leaders, went to
jail for antitrust violations. 21 4 Clearly, among white collar crimes as a
whole, antitrust violations rank distressfully low in the severity and fre-
quency of sentences. 215
76-448A (D. Ariz.) (pending) (discussed in notes 146-48 and accompanying text
supra).
211. See also Rahi, supra note 57, at 780.
212. See generally Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal An-
titrust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1967); Whiting, CriminalAntitrust Liability
of Corporate Representatives, 48 GEO. L.J. 530 (1960).
213. Project, supra note 7, at 640 n.930.
214. Id. at 638 n.918. But see Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy:
Part I, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, April 1961, at 132; Smith, The Incredible Electrical
Conspiracy: Part II, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 1961, at 161. The author states
that 394 individuals received jail sentences ranging from four hours to one year
during the period from 1909 to 1964; most of these sentences, however, were
suspended.
215. We are no longer surprised to read that a corporation has
been fined $13 million for polluting a Virginia river, a state
legislator in Illinois sentenced to three years in prison for ac-
cepting bribes, a doctor in New York sentenced to five years in
jail and fined more than $100,000 for Medicaid fraud, a bus-
inessman from Los Angeles sentenced to five years in prison for
taking part in a scheme to defraud the Small Business Adminis-
tration, a stock manipulator in New York sentenced to ten years
in prison and two bank executives in Memphis sentenced to five
years in prison for fraud and misappropriation of bank funds
[T]he severity of antitrust sentences has lagged far behind
those of other white collar criminals. In fiscal 1976, those con-
victed of securities fraud were sentenced to an average of 45.7
months in prison. Transportation of forged securities brought
an average of 45.4 months imprisonment and bank embezzle-
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One reason for the scarce use of criminal imprisonment seems to lie in
the public's perception that antitrust violations are not violent crimes or
crimes of moral turpitude. 216 Nevertheless, in terms of aggregate
economic effects, the consequences of antitrust violations are far more
serious than many types of crimes. Consequently, the trend is for the
Justice Department and state antitrust enforcement agencies to seek im-
prisonment more frequently as a penalty for antitrust violations. 217 Impris-
onment is still reserved, however, for the more egregious types of viola-
tions, normally the per se antitrust violations, where the law is clear and
where an illegal purpose is easily proven. 2 18
Fines are imposed much more frequently than imprisonment in
criminal antitrust cases. 219 As with imprisonment, one of the primary pur-
poses of the criminal fine is to deter anticompetitive activity by taking away
the benefits to be derived from such activity. As the risk of financial penal-
ty increases, there is less chance the expected excess revenues of anticom-
petitive activity will outweigh the revenues from competitive activity.
220 Of
course, for this to be effective the courts must be able to impose fines that
equal or exceed the expected gains from anticompetitive behavior. Such
gains can sometimes be considerable and, as stated previously, the max-
imum fine allowed by law may not be sufficient to outweigh the benefits. 221
ment an average of 22.6 months. Defendants convicted of in-
come tax fraud, a relatively common offense, were sentenced to
an average of 15.4 months imprisonment.
In comparison the 75 defendants convicted in fiscal 1976 of
pure antitrust violations-where there was no violence-re-
ceived a total of two and one half months. The average is mean-
ingless and not worth computing. In fact, a higher percentage
of persons convicted of violating the migratory bird laws were
sentenced to prison, for longer terms, than those who violated
the antitrust laws.
Address by D. Baker, To Make the Penalty Fit the Crime: How to Sentence An-
titrust Felons, Tenth New England Antitrust Conference 3-6 (Nov. 20, 1976),
reprinted in Project, supra note 7, at 639 n.920.
216. See Flynn, supra note 212, at 1318.
217. See generally Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978); Fellmeth,
supra note 9.
218. See Project, supra note 7, at 636. See generally Baker, supra note 217.
219. See generally Flynn, supra note 212; Whiting, supra note 212.
220. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 209, at 118. See also notes 209
& 210 and accompanying text supra.
221. It should be noted, however, that each successive stage of a criminal
conspiracy is subject to a separate penalty and consequently the aggregate fine
may exceed the statutory limit. Furthermore, criminal penalties are not the only
potential deterrents to anticompetitive activity. Both federal and state law pro-
vide for recovery of treble damages; this can be a considerable amount. See notes
124-48 and accompanying text supra.
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Regardless of the length of jail sentences and the severity of criminal
fines, the deterrent effect is possible only if there is a viable threat of prose-
cution and conviction. Antitrust enforcement authorities must com-
municate their willingness to enforce the antitrust laws vigorously. The
State of Missouri has joined the ranks of those states that are known as ac-
tive antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to criminal prosecu-
tions. 222
A significant factor allowing Missouri to pursue criminal prosecutions
actively is the Missouri Antitrust Law provision granting the Attorney
General similar powers to those of a state prosecutor regarding the use of
grand juries. 22 3 The effective use of grand jury proceedings by the State of
Missouri has resulted in numerous indictments for antitrust violations in
recent years. 224
State v. Dugan225 was initiated in April 1979, after a Buchannan
County grand jury issued indictments against Kenneth Dugan, an
employee and agent of the Dugan-Lowe Oil Company, and the Dugan-
Lowe Oil Company. The indictments charged the defendants with engag-
ing in a continuing combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint
of trade in violation of the Missouri Antitrust Law. The conspiracy, occur-
ring between February 1977 andJanuary 1979, concerned fixing the pump
price of gasoline at stations owned and operated by Dugan-Lowe Oil Com-
222. As of 1977, one author listed Wisconsin as the leader in state criminal
antitrust enforcement. Other states listed were California, Colorado, Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon. Project,
supra note 7, at 633.
223. RSMO § 416.051.2 (1978). See Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 12, at 507.
224. The State of Missouri also has been successful with the use of the
criminal information. For example, in State v. ESB, Inc., No. 78-1771 (Cir. Ct.,
Jackson Cty., Mo. 1978), Missouri filed a criminal information alleging that two
companies, ESB, Inc. and Burns & Griffin, Inc., had entered into a horizontal
price-fixing and territorial division arrangement in the sale of emergency lighting
equipment. Specifically, it was alleged that the two companies agreed to either
obtain the participation of Comet Industries, Inc. in the horizontal price-fixing
combination and division of territories or to terminate Comet as a distributor of
ESB's equipment in Missouri. Comet refused to join in the alleged conspiracy
and as a result was terminated as a master distributor of ESB's products. The liti-
gation resulted in a consent judgment whereby ESB, Inc. and Burns & Griffin,
Inc. agreed to abide by the state antitrust laws in the marketing and distribution
of lighting equipment. Because of the costs incurred by the state in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of the action, the defendants paid a total of $24,897.56 to
the state. See SUMMARY OF AcTIVITIES, supra note 131.
Nevertheless, even though the criminal information can be used effectively, the
grand jury process and indictment method is preferred. The grand jury provides
a valuable vehicle for discovery in the early stages of the litigation.
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pany and stations owned by various unindicted conspirators. In addition
to the indictments, the State of Missouri filed a civil parens patriae action
against Kenneth Dugan, Dugan-Lowe Oil Company, and the other con-
spirators. 226 After discovery and negotiations, the Antitrust Division was
able to reach an agreement with the defendants in both the criminal ac-
tion and the civil parens patriae action. The agreement resulted in both
Kenneth Dugan and Dugan-Lowe Oil Company entering guilty pleas in
the criminal prosecution, Kenneth Dugan paying a criminal fine of
$5,000, and Dugan-Lowe Oil Company paying a criminal fine of
$10,000.227 In the civil parens patriae action, a settlement was reached
whereby Kenneth Dugan and Dugan-Lowe Oil Company paid $45,000 in
damages. 228
A good example of Missouri's leading role among states seeking
criminal sanctions is State v. Central Petroleum Distributors, Inc.229 In
this 1979 case, the State of Missouri indicted ten oil companies and eight
individuals on charges of fixing the pump price of gasoline in violation of
the Missouri Antitrust Law. The indictments alleged that beginning as
early as October 1975 and continuing until as late as October 1979, the
defendants fixed the pump price of gasoline injoplin, Missouri, at stations
they owned, leased, and operated. The defendant-companies were
charged with communicating through their employees, in person and by
telephone, with each other and with certain unindicted conspirators to
discuss, coordinate, or agree on the pump price at which gasoline would be
sold in Joplin. It was alleged that as a result of the conspiracy, many
gasoline purchasers in the Joplin area were deprived of free and open com-
petition in the sale of gasoline and had paid higher prices for gasoline than
they would have paid in the absence of the restraint.
At the time of this writing, the president of one defendant-company
has pleaded guilty; criminal fines totaling $41,000 were paid to the state by
various defendant-individuals and defendant-companies; civil fines total-
ing $223,000 have been paid to the state. The action is still pending
against some defendants. 230
On July 3, 1980, a St. Louis County grand jury returned indictments
against three retailers marketing gasoline in Missouri, their trade associa-
tion, and eleven of their corporate officials in the case of State v. Bonafide
226. Missouri v. Dugan-Lowe Oil Co., No. 79-6055 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (settle-
ment agreement).
227. State v. Dugan, No. 379-53 (Cir. Ct., Buchannan Cty., Mo. 1979) (set-
tlement agreement). See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
228. Missouri v. Dugan-Lowe Oil Co., No. 79-6055 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (settle-
ment agreement). See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
229. No. 179-80-116M (Cir. Ct., Jasper Cty., Mo. 1979).
230. Id. The civil fines resulted from a companion parenspatriae action filed
by the State of Missouri against 22 separate defendants. Missouri v. Central
Petroleum Distribs., Inc., No. 80-5019 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
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Oil Co., Inc.231 Charges were similar to those made in Central Petroleum.
A guilty plea has been entered by one defendant; other charges still are
awaiting trial court action. 23 2
The enforcement of state antitrust laws through successful criminal
prosecution is to many the most salient characteristic of the Missouri Anti-
trust Division. Criminal sanctions represent a great deterrent to potential
violators of the antitrust laws if it is known that violators will be identified
successfully and prosecuted vigorously. Clearly, the Missouri Antitrust
Division has shown an intention to prosecute criminal antitrust violations;
that commitment will remain in the coming years.
B. Civil Actions
Civil actions represent a necessary counterpart to criminal prosecu-
tions. The Missouri Antitrust Law has provisions for injunctive relief, con-
sent decrees, and treble damages in civil actions, 233 while federal legisla-
tion arms the Attorney General with the parens patriae enforcement tool
through section 4c of the Clayton Act. 23 4 Quite often, criminal prosecu-
tions are accompanied by a civil parens patriae action, as seen, for exam-
ple, in State v. Dugan.235 Of course, parens patriae cases unaccompanied
by criminal charges also have been initiated.
The parens patriae action is an important addition to the traditional
civil remedies, serving as a further deterrent to activity that was previously
approachable by the state only by way of injunction. In the classic parens
patriae case, the possibility of aparens patriae action provides an incentive
for a corporation to eliminate an illegal restraint of trade before detection
rather than persisting until enjoined. 23 6 A few recent cases are illustrative
of the Missouri Antitrust Division's use of the parens patriae action23 7 and
other civil remedies and actions to enforce the state's antitrust laws.
On May 5, 1979, the Missouri Antitrust Division filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in the
case of Missouri v. Petroleum Retailers Organization.23  Missouri
231. No. 81-0250 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
232. Id. It is the history of such conspiracy cases that, after one defendant
"breaks," the rest are not far behind. See, e.g., Central Petroleum Distribs., dis-
cussed in notes 229 & 230 and accompanying text supra. Extremely helpful in
this regard is the provision in Missouri's Antitrust Law which affords transac-
tional immunity to witnesses compelled to testify over their fifth amendment
privilege in grand jury proceedings. See RSMO § 416.111 (1978).
233. RSMO §§ 416.061.2, .071.1, .121.1(2) (1978) (injunctive relief); id. §
416.061.4 (consent judgments or decrees); id. § 416.121.1(1) (treble damages).
234. See notes 80-105 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 225-28 and accompanying text supra.
236. See Hill, supra note 82, at 1380.
237. See also Missouri v. Dugan-Lowe Oil Co., No. 79-6055 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
(settlement agreement); notes 225-28 and accompanying text supra.
238. No. 77-4107 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (settlement agreement).
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brought the action in its parens patriae capacity and sought injunctive
relief. The complaint charged the Petroleum Retailers Organization and
several gas station retailers with conspiracy to close down retail service sta-
tions in Missouri for a four-day period during May 1979. The proposed
shutdown was an attempt by PRO station owners to be part of a nation-
wide concerted refusal to sell gasoline designed to inconvenience the
public so seriously that the Department of Energy would raise the ceiling
price for gasoline sales. After several meetings, the state and the defend-
ants reached a settlement whereby the defendants agreed not to engage in
a concerted shutdown and agreed to notify the Attorney General's office in
the event that consideration of a concerted shutdown was contemplated in
the future.28 9
State v. Stephens 240 was an action by the State of Missouri to enjoin the
blockading of barge and pipeline petroleum terminals. Independent
truckers in Missouri sought to coerce a change in governmental regula-
tions-maximum trucking tariffs-by their blockades of barge and pipe-
line terminals in the summer of 1979. The blockade was intended to cause
fuel shortages so injurious to the public that the federal government would
feel compelled to grant relief by accepting the truckers' demands. On July
5, 1979, the circuit court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the
concerted action to impede access to the pipeline terminal at Scott City,
Missouri.2 4 1
State v. Smith 242 was a companion case to Stephens where the State of
Missouri obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting similar concerted
action to block or otherwise impede access to oil pipelines and barge ter-
minals in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. 243 State v. Gabel244 was a similar ac-
tion resulting in a temporary injunction in June 1979, prohibiting con-
certed action to block or otherwise impede access to service stations and
fuel pumps throughout the State of Missouri; the injunction also pro-
hibited the service stations from refusing to sell gasoline. 245 It should be
noted that under the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc. ,246
239. Id. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
240. No. 379-330 (Cir. Ct., Scott Cty., Mo., July 5, 1979).
241. Id.
242. No. 679-26 (Cir. Ct., Cape Gir. Cty., Mo., July 5, 1979).
243. Id.
244. No. 425088 (Cir. Ct., St. L. Cty., Mo., July 16, 1979).
245. Id. The issuance of these injunctions can be melodramatic. In the above
three cases, the author was required to proceed to the respective gasoline term-
inals at night and personally serve the injunctions on the truck operators. During
this time period, it was also not uncommon for violence to accompany the an-
titrust activity.
246. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980). See notes
153-80 and accompanying text supra.
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the State of Missouri arguably may have been barred from acting against
the restraints seen in PRO, Stephens, Smith, and Gabel because of the
alleged underlying political motivation for the defendants' activities. 247
A consent judgment where five lessors of coin-operated vending and
amusement machines in the St. Louis area agreed not to allocate
customers or potential customers was the culmination of civil litigation in
State v. Wonder Novelty Co.248 The State of Missouri filed a petition for
injunctive relief in 1979 charging five defendants with agreeing not to
solicit customers of other defendants and various other conspirators. It was
alleged further that defendants agreed not to compete for customers of
other defendants or conspirators on the basis of commission rates or ser-
vices. Defendants were charged with using common solicitors and with
utilizing location agreements which ran for two-to-five year periods and
which were renewed automatically, tending to restrict unreasonably the
ability of owners of locations to switch coin-machine operators. In addi-
tion, the defendants were charged with making "courtesy calls" to other
defendants when a dissatisfied customer contacted a "new lessor." In such
cases, the new lessor would inform the current lessor of that customer's
dissatisfaction. It was also charged that the new lessor then would refuse to
provide service unless the current lessor acquiesced and removed his
machines.
The impact of such a conspiracy would be to deprive persons wishing
to lease coin-operated machines in the St. Louis area of free and open
competition in the leasing market. Furthermore, the conspiracy would
restrain persons leasing coin-operated machines from changing lessors.
The quality of service to persons leasing coin-operated machines and
ultimately to consumers would also be diminished.
The terms of the consent judgment entered into with the Attorney
General's Office provided that the defendants would not divide, allocate,
or apportion any customers or potential customers, would individually
solicit customers, and would lease or service any coin-operated machines
to or for any consumer. 249 These restrictions were to remain in effect for
five years and were not to apply to lawful covenants not to compete or valid
restrictive covenants ancillary to employment. 250 In addition, the defen-
dants agreed to pay the State of Missouri $25,000 in settlement of the ac-
tion.251
247. See notes 181-86 and accompanying text supra.
248. No. 430472 (Cir. Ct., St. L. Cty., Mo., Nov. 1, 1979).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131. It should be noted
that the Missouri Antitrust Division actively enforces the terms of all court orders
obtained against alleged antitrust violators. For example, the state recently ob-
tained a contempt order against a Kansas City Barbers Union official for having
violated an October 1976 consent judgment resulting from State v. Local No. 37,
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Still pending at the time of this writing is State v. Memorial Heritage,
Inc. , 2 in which the state has alleged that the defendant's cemetery rules
and regulations violate the Missouri Antitrust Law by imposing an illegal
tying arrangement between the purchase of interment spaces in the defen-
dant's cemeteries (the tying product) and the purchase of marker installa-
tion services (the tied product) in those cemeteries. The defendant owns or
operates three cemeteries in the Kansas City, Missouri area and requires
that all grave markers placed in those cemeteries be installed by the defen-
dant. The Missouri Antitrust Division feels that the outcome of this case
will have sweeping significance in that the alleged violation is currently a
widespread practice in the State of Missouri. 253
Of course, not all civil investigations initiated by the Missouri Antitrust
Division actually have to be litigated for the enforcement purpose to be
achieved. For example, in December 1977, the Antitrust Division
prepared to file antitrust charges against the Henges Division of Guarantee
Electrical Company and Environmental Interiors. The charges were to
refer to construction projects where unreasonable restraints of trade
allegedly were occurring regarding ceiling subcontracting work being
No. 28817 (Cir. Ct., Cole Cty., Mo., Oct. 21, 1976). The consent judgment,
which was to be effective until October 1986, prohibited eight locals and their of-
ficers from agreeing to fix the prices for various barber services and the hours dur-
ing which establishments offering barber services could be open for business. The
state alleged that the union official had tried to discourage a nonunion Kansas
City barber from offering haircuts on certain days for $1. The state successfully
obtained the contempt order and the official was assessed a civil fine of $500. See
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
252. No. 78-3992 (Cir. Ct., Jackson Cty., Mo.) (pending).
253. Tying arrangements have long been held to be per se violations of the
Sherman Act and Clayton Act. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S.
38 (1962); Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917). "A tie exists when a seller, having a product which buyers want (the
'tying product'), refuses to sell it alone and insists that any buyer who wants it
must also purchase another product (the 'tied product')." L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 29, at 431.
Case law has refined the tying per se violation and requires the violator to have
market power in the tying product and that the tie result in an appreciable
restraint on competition in the market for the tied product. It is required further
that the restraint affect a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied
product. 356 U.S. at 6. In addition, the courts have required that the tied pro-
duct and the tying product be two distinct commodities or services. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). This is the central issue in State v. Memorial
Heritage, Inc. See generally Abrams, Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing
Contracts, 53 CHI. B. REC. 75 (1971).
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done for certain school districts. Following negotiations, several contract-
ing firms and three Missouri school districts entered into an agreement for
a complete release of all antitrust claims arising from the ceiling work in
return for payment by Henges and Environmental Interiors of $15,000 to
the school districts. 254
V. OUT-OF-COURT ACTIVITIES BY STATES DESIGNED TO
EDUCATE THE PUBLIC AND TO ADVOCATE A STRONG POLICY
OF COMPETITION IN THE GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNITY
Because active antitrust enforcement efforts are a recent phenomenon
in most states, educational programs are essential. Three specific reasons
can be articulated for establishing extensive antitrust educational pro-
grams at the state level.25 5 First, the antitrust laws are frequently complex
and confusing. Since a violation of the antitrust laws carries with it the
possibility of criminal sanctions, attempts should be made to educate the
business community as to the intricacies of the law before subjecting them
to such penalties. Second, some attorneys for small businesses are unac-
quainted with the more complex principles involved in antitrust litigation.
Educational programs will assist them in advising their small business
clients. Third, there are fewer violations when the public is aware of the
law. With an educated public, the business community more likely will
avoid illegal practices, knowing that such behavior likely will be identified
and prosecuted. Similarly, businesses will be in a better position to discern
whether their competitors are acting in a manner that violates the antitrust
laws.
The Missouri Antitrust Division has published and distributed a pam-
phlet on antitrust enforcement in Missouri. The pamphlet is designed to
be an educational tool. 25 6 This pamphlet is intended to acquaint Missouri
businesspersons and consumers with some of the basic provisions of the an-
titrust laws, to alert them to several common anticompetitive practices,
and to advise them where to bring antitrust questions and complaints. The
pamphlet describes the policy of competition and the system of antitrust
enforcement at both the federal and state levels. In addition, eight ex-
amples of illegal activities are given, covering such areas as price fixing,
divisions of markets or customers, limitations of production, agreements
by competitors not to do business with others, price fixing in the chain of
distribution, territorial or customer restrictions in the chain of distribu-
tion, tying arrangements, and monopolization. A toll-free Attorney
General's phone number is set out in the pamphlet to encourage citizens to
254. 906 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (March 22, 1979). See
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
255. See Miles, supra note 7, at 1351.
256. J. ASHCROFT, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN MISSOURI (1977)
(available on request at Missouri Attorney General's Office).
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call the Attorney General's Office if they have an antitrust complaint or if
they want further information about antitrust enforcement. 257
Despite the obvious benefits of educating the citizens of Missouri con-
cerning the antitrust laws, the function of advocating a policy of competi-
tion among governmental agencies may be even more important. 28 Sev-
eral studies of federal regulations suggest that the ultimate cost to
consumers for unnecessary anticompetitive regulations can be quite sub-
stantial. The 1979 Report of the National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Law and Procedures estimated the cost of air transportation
regulations at about $2 billion a year 2 9 and the cost of trucking regula-
tions at nearly $1 billion a year. 260 The ocean shipping regulations have
caused rates to be as much as an estimated forty-five percent higher than
they would be under competitive conditions. 261 The Report also notes that
with the Securities Act Amendments of 1975262 ending the system of fixing
brokerage commission rates in stock transactions, by 1977, institutional
brokerage rates dropped more than that forty-five percent and individual
rates by more than fifteen percent. 263 As a result, the consumer savings on
commission rates in 1976 were estimated at $700 million.264
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the need for ad-
vocating a competitive policy for governmental agencies in the recent
decision of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light. 26 5 The Court
noted that in 1972 there were 62,437 different units of local government
with potential to make economic choices without regard to their anticom-
petitive effects, thereby opening a "serious chink in the armor of antitrust
protection. ' 266
257. The toll-free number is 1-800-392-8222. This number also can be used
for other matters such as consumer fraud complaints.
258. See Flynn, supra note 9, at 505.
The long-run consumer benefits of active state attorney general antitrust
participation in all forms of state and local regulation may well prove of
greater economic significance to consumers than either state or parens
patriae treble damage activity under federal law ... [or] the prosecution
of local conspiracies in restraints of trade under the state antitrust law.
Id.
259. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NA-




262. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1969)).
263. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
184 (1979).
264. Id.
265. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
266. Id. at 408.
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State antitrust enforcement agencies should follow the developments
at the federal level where the Justice Department has been a strong ad-
vocate for restoring a policy of competition to governmental decision-mak-
ing. 267 One approach suggested for state enforcement agencies is to lobby
for legislation comparable to existing federal legislation which requires
government purchasing agents to report all identical bids received to the
Justice Department so that the Department can investigate the possibility
of illegal cooperation among bidders.268
The State of Missouri has been one of the leading states in advocating a
policy of competition to governmental entities. For example, in conjunc-
tion with the University of Missouri-Columbia, the Missouri Antitrust
Division has undertaken a bid-monitoring program modeled after the
federal program, using the computer facilities of the University to analyze
public bids in an attempt to detect any patterns which would suggest col-
lusive activity.2 69
Another example of advocacy activity by the Missouri Antitrust Divi-
sion is the Professional Licensing Board Seminar conducted by the Divi-
sion in 1979 for all state licensing boards in Missouri. At the seminar,
licensing statutes and regulations were evaluated from an antitrust per-
spective; changes were recommended where needed to bring statutes and
regulations into conformity with the antitrust laws.2 70
The Missouri Antitrust Division has also investigated several govern-
mental entities in Missouri and has been able to reach satisfactory
agreements with many regarding anticompetitive regulations without
resorting to the courts. One such example is the agreement reached on
May 25, 1979, between the Attorney General's Office and the City of St.
Louis.2 7 1 The agreement was reached after an investigation disclosed that
city regulations for the awarding of show dates for the city's Convention
and Exhibits Center were highly anticompetitive. The regulations pro-
vided that a promoter, having an exhibition on various set dates in one
year, would hold those dates in perpetuity to the exclusion of all potential-
ly competing promoters. The city informally agreed to discontinue this
practice and to adopt a procedure that the Antitrust Division and the city
drafted, which would comply with the antitrust laws. In return for the
city's compliance, the Missouri Antitrust Division agreed not to initiate
267. See Miles, supra note 7, at 1350.
268. See 41 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1976); Exec. Order No. 10,936, 26 FED. REG.
3555 (1961).
269. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
270. The Missouri Antitrust Division has held several such seminars in order
to help public and private purchasing agents identify antitrust violations and
develop purchasing procedures which will discourage noncompetitive practices
by suppliers. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 131.
271. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (June 7, 1979).
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any action against the city arising from antitrust violations respecting the
Convention Center's activities prior to the date of the agreement.2 72
Another example of elimination of anticompetitive activity of a gov-
ernmental entity without formal litigation involved the City of Excelsior
Springs, Missouri. This situation, however, was not resolved with as
cooperative an approach as seen with the City of St. Louis in the Conven-
tion Center case. Since 1940, Excelsior Springs had operated a municipally
owned Pepsi-Cola bottling plant. The city sold Pepsi-Cola and other soft
drinks it bottled in a seven-county area pursuant to a franchise granted to
Excelsior Springs by the Pepsi-Cola Company. The city's Pepsi-Cola
operation had an unfair competitive advantage over other soft drink fran-
chises operating in the same area because of the preferential tax treatment
it received as a governmental entity. The Missouri Antitrust Division
prepared an information in the nature of quo warranto to challenge the
authority of the city to run such an enterprise. Prior to the filing of the in-
formation, the City of Excelsior Springs divested itself of its Pepsi-Cola
bottling plant. 273
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of significant increases in power and funding through state
and federal legislation, the State of Missouri has joined with several other
states in a revival of state antitrust enforcement. The Missouri Antitrust
Division has been a leader in each major area of state involvement that has
emerged in the past decade and will continue to pursue vigorously an-
titrust enforcement at the state level in order to ensure a competitive
climate for the benefit of Missouri consumers and businesses.
It is hoped that the Missouri experience in recent state antitrust en-
forcement stands as a promising example of the effectiveness with which a
state antitrust enforcement unit can act. Clearly, federal authorities do
not have the resources to single-handedly protect the marketplace from
antitrust violators. Only with effective state involvement to complement
federal enforcement will it be possible to create the competitive climate so
necessary to our free enterprise system.
272. Id.
273. See SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIEs, supra note 131.
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